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On 11th December 1997, more than 150 nations signed and adopted the Kyoto Protocol, (United 
Nations 1998)1, an international agreement that commits the participants to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. The protocol is based on the scientific consensus that climate change is 
happening and that it’s extremely likely that human-made CO2 emissions are predominantly 
causing it (Liverman 2009)2.  
The first commitment period of the treaty started in 2008 and ended in 2012. A second 
commitment period was agreed on in 2012, in which 37 countries, including the European 
Union and its 28 Member States, have binding targets, (United Nations 2011)3. This led the 
European Union to the need for policy instruments to meet the Kyoto commitments. In 2000 a 
green paper on “Greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union” was presented 
by the European Commission4, this served as a basis for further discussions that helped to build 
the so-called European Emission Trading System (EU ETS), firstly introduced in 2005 
(Ellerman  and Buchner 2007)5.  
The EU Emissions Trading System is a “cap and trade” system in which the total volume of 
GHG emissions in the area are limited through the use of emission allowances. These 
allowances can be traded so that the least-cost measures can be taken up to reduce emissions. 
Despite the great number of positive results the system has achieved during the first period of 
its implementation (Laing et al, 2013)6, some critical issues have however arisen (Brown, 
Hanafi and Petsonk 2012)7, bringing to changes in the emission scheme as a whole.  
                                                 
1 UNITED NATIONS. (1998). Kyoto protocol to the united nations framework convention on climate 
change. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf 
2 LIVERMAN D.M. (2009). Conventions of climate change: constructions of danger and the 
dispossession of the atmosphere. Journal of Historical Geography 35: pp. 279-296. 
3 UNITED NATIONS. (2011). Compilation and synthesis of fifth national communications. 
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/sbi/eng/inf01.pdf 
4 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2000). Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the 
European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52000DC0087 
5 ELLERMAN A.D., BUCHNER B.K. (2007). The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: 
Origins, Allocation and Early results. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy: pp. 66-87. 
6 LAING T., SATO M., GRUBB M. and COMBERTI C. (2013). Assessing the Effectiveness of the EU 
Emission Trading System. Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, 126. 
7 BROWN L.M., HANAFI A. and PETSONK A. (2012). The EU Emissions Trading System: Results 
and Lessons Learned. 
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EU_ETS_Lessons_Learned_Report_EDF.pdf 
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In fact, the price on carbon raises costs associated with pollution and this can impact the 
competitiveness of certain industrial sectors which compete with countries where lower levels 
of actions are taken to reduce the GHG pollution. This could lead companies to transfer their 
productions to other countries with laxer measures to cut pollutant emissions. While the free 
allocation of emissions allowances seems to be a feasible solution to this problem, in some 
sectors it had brought some distortive effects. For example, in the power market the experience 
of the first two trading periods showed that power generators were able to pass on the cost of 
emission allowances to costumers, even when they received them for free (Sijm, Neuhoff and 
Chen, 2011)8. This is the reason why in Phase III of the EU ETS, operators in the power market 
are no longer eligible to receive free allowances and have to buy them in auctions (European 
Commission, 2011)9.   
The aim of this study is to check whether such a change in the policy influenced the way in 
which the cost of the allowances is passed on the electricity price and the magnitude of this 
phenomenon. The study is conducted in the Italian power market where little analysis regarding 
the Emission Trading System has, so far, been carried out. 
The dissertation is organized as follow. In the first chapter, the general characteristics of the EU 
Emissions Trading System are presented, underlining the benefits and results the scheme has 
achieved up to now. In the second chapter, the focus will shift to the power sector and to the 
way in which the allocation method of allowances has changed over the years. The third chapter 
will focus on the electricity power market; the electricity production mix of a country can in 
fact play an important role in the relationship between allowances price and power price. In the 
fourth and fifth chapter the empirical analysis is presented: through the Vector Error Correction 
Model we will analyze the impact of changes in the allowances price to the Italian electricity 
price. More precisely, in the former, data and the general model are described, in the latter we 
will report the methodology and the results obtained. Theoretical and empirical outcomes are 
then coped together in the final chapter.  
                                                 
8SIJM J., NEUHOFF K. and CHEN Y. (2011). CO2 cost pass-through and windfall profits in the power sector. 
Climate Policy, 6: pp 49-76. 
9 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2011). Commission decision of 29.03.2011 on guidance on the methodology to 
transitionally allocate free emission allowances to installations in respect of electricity pursuant to Article 10c(3) 
of Directive 2003/87/EC. 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/allowances/electricity/docs/c_2011_1983_en.pdf 
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1.  The Emissions Trading System 
 
The Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a cap and trade system firstly introduced in the 
European area in the 2005. It is the main tool of the European Union to fight the climate change 
and to accomplish the reduction targets of the Kyoto protocol. The EU ETS is the biggest 
emission trading system whose aim is to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions, it covers more 
than 11.000 industrial plants and power stations in 31 countries and also flights between airports 
of the countries involved10.  
The mechanism has been implemented over time through distinct trading periods, known as 





The first phase of the EU ETS, called also the pilot phase, ran the first two years, from 2005 to 
2007. This phase had the main purposes of testing the price formation in the carbon market and 
establishing the necessary infrastructures for verifying, monitoring and reporting emissions. 
The aim of the pilot phase was therefore to ensure that Member States would have been able to 
meet their commitments. Firms could meet their obligations under the EU ETS through the use 
of certain emission reduction units generated under the Kyoto Protocol clean development 
mechanism (CDM)11, as specified in the Directive 2004/101/EC12. 
                                                 
10 Source: the European Commission’s page on the EU ETS https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en 
11 The CDM allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified emission reduction (CER) 
credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2. These CERs can be traded and sold, and used by industrialized 
countries to meet a part of their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. 
12Directive 2004/101/EC of the EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 
2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, in 







Phase 4 and 
beyond
(from 2021)
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The second phase of the EU ETS coincided with the first commitment period under the Kyoto 
Protocol, running from 2008 to 2012. In this period, also the emission reduction units generated 
by the joint implementation (JI)13 could be used. This made the EU ETS the largest source of 
demand for the CDM and JI emission reduction units. Towards the end of this phase aviation 
was included in the scope of the EU ETS (Directive 2008/101/EC)14. This is also the period in 
which the EU set the so called “20-20-20” targets, a series of energy and climate targets to be 
met by 2020. These targets are meant to help the European Union to reach the primary objective 
of keeping climate change below the 2°C. They are: 
- Reducing the GHG emissions of at least 20% below 1990 levels 
- Reducing by 20% the primary energy use with respect to projected levels, to be achieved 
by improved energy efficiency 
- Increasing the fraction of EU energy consumption coming from renewable sources of 
20% or more. 
With these goals in mind and the lessons learnt from the first two phases, the Emission Trading 
System has been shaped for the third phase. This phase is the current one as it runs from the 
end of 2012 to 2020 and it coincides with the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.  
The EU ETS doesn’t have an end date and continues beyond this period, underlining the 
commitment of the EU to tackle climate change. The actual long-term objective is reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% with respect to 1990 levels (European Commission, 
2018)15. 
 
1.1 How does it work 
The main feature of the Emissions Trading System is that the total amount of GHG that can be 
produced by the installations covered by the system is capped. This cap is decreased over time 
so that the total emissions fall. Companies buy or receive emission allowances which can be 
traded if needed, each allowance represents a tonne of CO2 that can be emitted by the company 
which owns it. At the end of a year, participants must give back an emission allowance for 
                                                 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32004L0101 
13 Under Joint Implementation, countries with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are eligible to transfer 
and/or acquire emission reduction units (ERUs) and use them to meet part of their emission reduction target. 
14 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community. 
Official Journal of the European Union, 8/3.  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008L0101 
15 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2018). The commission calls for a climate neutral Europe by 2050. Brussels. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6543_en.htm 
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every tonne of CO2 they have emitted during the year. If a business has insufficient allowances, 
then it must either buy more allowances on the market or take measures to reduce its emissions. 
Besides auctions, participants can buy and sell allowances from each other. 
The limited or capped supply guarantees that emissions rights have a value and there is demand 
from those participants with a lower cost of making reductions. The system therefore incentives 
the effort to be redistributed between businesses so that emissions reductions take place to those 
sectors where it costs less. 
If companies fail to surrender sufficient allowances in time, significant fines are imposed up to 
100€/tCO2. In addition, participants face an obligation to surrender the allowances owned. In 
this way the cap is maintained effectively. 
 
In this picture, Factory B does not have enough allowances to cover all its emissions. It can therefore decide 
either to buy them from Auction Markets or to acquire them from the company A, which is in surplus of 
allowances. Note that factory A could also decide to bank allowances for use in later years. 
 
As far as the cap is concerned, it is set and established at EU level by the Commission. The 
single wide cap is expressed in tonnes of CO2 and changes in each trading period. The cap in 
phase 3 ensures the meeting of the EU’s 2020 greenhouse gas emissions reduction target 
(European Commission, 2010)16. As is shown in Figure 2, in the first two phases the installation 
cap was fixed and kept constant during the whole phase. In phase 3 things changed so that the 
total cap decreases each year to 2020 and beyond by a linear reduction factor. More precisely, 
                                                 
16 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2010). Commission Decision of 9 July 2010 on the Community-wide quantity 
of allowances to be issued under the EU Emission Trading Scheme for 2013. (2010/384/EU). Official Journal of 
the European Union, 175/36. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32010D0384 
Figure 1.1. An example of transmission of allowances between participants. 
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it will decrease by 1.74% compared to 2010, the midpoint of the second phase. This means that 
in absolute terms the number of the EU Emissions Allowances (EUA) will fall annually by 
38,264,246 allowances. Following this scheme, the cap for the year 2013 results to be at 
2,084,301,856 EUAs.  
 
 
Source: the EC’s webpage, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap_en 
 
The diagram clearly shows that from Phase 3 a decreasing cap is applied. Note that from 2013 
the cap includes sectors and gases not covered in phase 2, this explains the reason why the 
decrease is limited. The supply of emission allowances is determined by the total number of 
allowances issued, either allocated for free or auctioned.  The balance between this supply and 
the demand of the market determines the carbon price. Scarcity is the key driven for a 
competitive price. 
 
1.2 Main features of the EU ETS 
As already stated, the Emission Trading System goes under continuous transformations. The 
scope of the EU ETS in terms of greenhouse gases, sectors and geography keep increasing, and 
this increases the effectiveness of the system as a whole. Other developments over the years are 
related to improvements in rules for free allocation, monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV) and to an increased use of auctioning as an allocation method, as specified in Directive 
Figure 1.2. Single EU wide cap during the first three phases of the Emission Trading System 
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2018/410/EC17. From the beginning of phase 3 approximately half of the overall greenhouse 
gas emissions are covered by the system. 
In the table 1.1, the main changes in the key features of the EU ETS during the first three phases 
are summarized.  
 
Table 1.1. Key features of the EU ETS system during the first three phases 






Geography EU27 EU27 + Norway, 
Iceland, 
Liechtenstein 
EU27, + Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Croatia 
Sectors Power stations and 
other combustion 
plants ≥ 20MW 
Oil refineries 
Coke ovens 







Paper and board 
Same as phase 1 + 
Aviation (from 
2012) 




Nitric, adipic and glyoxylic 
acid production 
CO2 capture, transport in 
pipelines and geological 
storage. 
GHGs CO2 CO2,  
N2O emissions via 
opt-in 
CO2, N2O, PFC from 
aluminium production 
Cap 2058 million tCO2 1859 million tCO2 2084 million tCO2 in 2013, 




EUAs EUAs, CERs, 
ERUs 
EUAs, CERs, ERUs 
 
Note: CERs from projects 
registered after 2012 must be 
from Least Developed 
Countries 
 
Source: The European Commission’s page on the EU ETS https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en 
                                                 
17 Directive 2018/410/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, and Decision (EU) 
2015/1814. Official Journal of the European Union, 76/3. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2018.076.01.0003.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2018:076:TOC 
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Geography 
At the beginning all the 25 EU member states joined the EU ETS program. The number 
increased to 27 (EU27) in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania entered the European Union. In 
2008 also Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway joined the ETS scheme which from phase 2 
covered the whole European Economic Area. With the addition of Croatia in 2013 the system 
reached its actual extension. 
 
Sectors 
Starting from the most GHG-intensive sectors in the first phase, the EU ETS increased its 
sectoral scope in 2012 by adding the CO2 emissions of the aviation sector.  
In phase 3 further expansion was reached with the addition of the sectors petrochemicals and 
other chemicals, aluminium and carbon capture and storage. 
 
Greenhouse gases 
In the first phase, only CO2 emissions were covered. Phase 2 allowed for voluntary inclusion of 
N2O emissions at the discretion of EU Member States. The EU ETS phase 3 added N2O 
emissions from all nitric, adipic and glyoxylic acid production and PFC emissions from 
aluminium production. 
 
Besides, installations that emit less than 25 ktCO2 are allowed to opt-out from the EU ETS if 
they are subject to similar measures because the administrative costs per unit of emissions could 
be relatively too high for them. 
 
1.3 Benefits and results of cap and trade 
The “cap and trade” structure is not the only feasible one when implementing policies about 
emissions reduction but it is the mechanism that better contributes in reaching the European 
targets in an effective way. A tax would not guarantee the achievement of the GHG emissions 
reduction target and, when many nations are involved, it requires agreement across all countries 
on the right carbon price. Determining and setting the “right price” without over- or 
undercharging companies is also very difficult. Another possible approach is the so-called 
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command-and-control approach. In this case a standard limit per installation may be imposed, 
but at the cost of providing little flexibility to companies regarding how or where emission 
reductions take place. The system chosen by the EU allows to reach the emissions targets at the 
lowest cost through trading among companies (Laing et al. 2013)18. The carbon price is then set 
by the market, as well explained in Ellerman, Convery and De Perthuis (2010)19. 
The choice of the cap-and-trade mechanism has been driven by some important key benefits: 
❖ Flexibility and cost-effectiveness: the system gives freedom to companies regarding 
how to reach the emission targets. This flexibility implies that the same carbon price is 
faced by each firm and ensures that cuts in GHG emissions happen where it costs least 
to do so. 
❖ Certainty about quantity: the maximum quantity of GHG emissions for a period of time 
is known ex ante. This is reassuring for the market and well supports the EU’s 
international objectives and environmental goals. 
❖ Revenue: the auctioning of emission allowances results to be a source of revenue for 
the governments involved. At least 50% of this type of income should be used to fund 
measures to fight climate change in the EU. 
❖ Minimizing risk to Member State budgets: the certainty about emission reductions 
reduces the risk that Member States will need to purchase additional allowances to reach 
their international commitments of the Kyoto Protocol. 
These theoretical benefits of the EU ETS find confirmation in the results the system actually 
achieved during its first period of life. There is in fact a general consensus within the literature 
that the system has obtained greenhouse gas abatement (Healy et al. 2015)20. Besides, the 
European Commission published a statistical analysis based on data from the Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL)21. In their work the Commission computed the average 
annual emissions per installation, finding out that, for example, in 2010 average emissions 
decreased with respect to 2005 level more than 17.000 tonnes CO2. In Table 1.2 estimates of 
the average abatements in emissions from various papers are reported. It can be easily noted 
that the literature confirms that in phase 1 an average reduction of 3% in GHG emissions has 
                                                 
18 LAING T. et al. (2013). Assessing the Effectiveness of the EU Emission Trading System. Centre for 
Climate Change Economics and Policy, 126. 
19 ELLERMAN A.D., CONVERY F.J. and DE PERTHIUS C. (2010). Pricing Carbon: the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Cambridge University Press. 
20 HEALY S., SCHUMACHER K., STROIA A. and SLINGERLAND S. (2015).  Review of literature on EU ETS 
Performance. Öko-Institut Working Paper 2/2015. https://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/2455/2015-001-en.pdf 
21 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2011). The EU ETS is delivering emission cuts. 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/factsheet_ets_emissions_en.pdf 
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occurred, even if abatements varied strongly across countries. However, the system is unable 
to deliver both GHG emissions cuts and incentive low-carbon technology. Low EUA prices in 
fact have failed to promote investments in such technologies and there may be the need of 
complimentary policies to improve the efficiency of the EU ETS. 
On the other hand, adverse impacts of the emission mechanism on the economic performance 
of the regulated firms was not found, as explained by Martin, Muûls and Wagner (2012)22.  
Some firms were even able to increase their profits by pricing the opportunity costs of 
allowances obtained for free. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the EU ETS decreased 
the competitiveness of the regulated companies. 
 
Table 1.2. Estimates of abatement in the literature 
Authors Estimated 
abatement 























-5.7% Germany 2005-2007 All CRF 
(UNFCCC) 
 




                                                 
22 MARTIN R., MUÛLS M. and WAGNER U. (2012). An evidence review of the EU Emissions Trading System, 
focusing on effectiveness of the system in driving industrial abatement. Department of Energy and Climate Change. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48449/5725-
an-evidence-review-of-the-eu-emissions-trading-sys.pdf 
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2. EU ETS and the Power Sector 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the European Emission Trading System is a dynamic 
system in continuous transformation where deep attention is given to the way in which 
participants act within the mechanism and to the reaction of the market. Changes don’t always 
influence the system as a whole but can affect only some sectors: one of the sectors in which 
transformations among the first three phases are more evident is the power sector.  
The risk that increased costs due to climate policies could put business in international 
disadvantage made the Commission assign free allowances allocation in the electricity sector 
(among others) in the first two phases23. Despite the fact that allowances were received without 
bearing any cost, it has been found by many studies that companies in the power sector were 
able to pass on the cost of the allowances to costumers (Hintermann 2016, among others)24, 
obtaining the so-called windfall profits. This is the reason why from the third phase, 100% of 
the allowances given to the power sector is subject to auctioning.  
 
2.1 The risk of Carbon Leakage 
Firms and sectors under the EU ETS are exposed to direct and indirect costs increases, which 
are summarized in the table 2.1. Direct costs are related to the need of purchasing CO2 
allowances; indirect costs come from the rise in the electricity price when power suppliers pass 
on the costs of allowances to their customers. Other indirect expenses come from administrative 
costs related to the compliance with carbon legislation. 
The cost increase can easily lead to a loss in competitiveness when EU firms compete on foreign 
markets and this may induce them to transfer their production from the European Area to region 
characterized by a more favourable regime in terms of commitments associated to the GHG 
emissions. This is better known as Carbon Leakage. 
                                                 
23 Brief summary of how allocation in Phase 1 and Phase 2 was determined. 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/nap_en#tab-0-0 
24 HINTERMANN B. (2016). Pass-Through of CO2 Emission Costs to Hourly Electricity Prices in Germany. 
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 3. 
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The Directive 2009/29/EC25, defines Carbon Leakage as follows: “In the event that other 
developed countries and other major emitters of greenhouse gases do not participate in this 
international agreement, this could lead to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions in third 
countries where industry would not be subject to comparable carbon constraints (carbon 
leakage), and at the same time could put certain energy-intensive sectors and subsectors in the 
Community which are subject to international competition at an economic disadvantage. This 
could undermine the environmental integrity and benefit of actions by the Community”.  
 
Table 2.1. Main costs faced by the EU ETS participants 
EU ETS COSTS 
Direct costs Come directly from the need of purchasing the 
Emission Allowances. EUA price is the main 
determinant of this type of cost. 
Indirect costs Are due to the rise in the electricity price caused by the 
Emission Trading System.  
Administrative costs Are related with the compliance with carbon 
legislation, such as back-office operations, MRV etc.. 
 
The risk that a company in the EU jurisdiction could be better off by relocating outside the EU 
area is harmful not only for its negative social effects but also from an environmental point of 
view. Therefore, carbon leakage may neutralize the actions taken in Europe and it is a risk that 
must be addressed by the European Community. 
There are many ways in which this problem can be faced and the debate in Europe is not already 
concluded. One possible solution is the imposition of border adjustment measures for 
competing imports, as suggested by KUIK and HOFKES (2010)26. If, in fact, importers were 
obliged to purchase and surrender EUAs to the authorities when importing goods, the advantage 
of non-EU producers would be lost. This type of solution comes with some problems: first, the 
carbon leakage and competitiveness loss must be accurately assessed; second, the “fair” level 
                                                 
25Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowances trading scheme of the Community. Official Journal 
of the European Union, 140/63.  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:en:PDF 
26 KUIK O., HOFKES M. (2010). Border adjustment for European Emission trading: Competitiveness and 
carbon leakage. Energy Policy, 38, pp. 1741-1748. 
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of EUAs to be imposed on imported products is not easy to estimate. For these reasons, the 
solutions already taken within the EU ETS concern the way in which allowances are allocated.  
While in a textbook cap-and-trade system the distribution of allowances should not be relevant 
for the final level of activities and prices, and therefore of competitiveness, (Markusen 1975)27, 
in a real-word the way in which EUAs are allocated (auction versus free allocation) may matter 
to the extent that sectors exposed to foreign competition could receive some relief from free 
allocation.  
Some several provisions to limit the direct emission costs and to protect the competitive position 
of EU businesses are included in the EU ETS Directive (European Commission, 2015)28 which 
aims to address the risk of carbon leakage. In this directive, the rules of determining sectors at 
risk of carbon leakage are presented. Whenever one sector meets the carbon leakage criteria, it 
is put in the so-called carbon leakage list, which is renewed every 5 years. These sectors 
received 100% of their allowances for free during the second phase, reduced to 80% from 2013 
and to 30% by 2020. 
The criteria to be entitled to enter the carbon leakage list are several, and consist in both 
quantitative and qualitative requirements. As far as the quantitative methods are concerned, a 
sector is “deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage” if: 
❖ The sum of all additional costs (direct and indirect) subsequent to the implementation 
of the Emission Trading System, computed as a proportion of the Gross Value Added 
(GVA), would result in a substantial increase of production costs of at least 5%; and 
❖ a non-EU trade intensity higher than 10%. The intensity can be defined as 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈 + 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
 
If these carbon leakage criteria are not met by a sector, there is still the possibility to enter the 
carbon leakage list through qualitative assessments. Sectors close to the threshold but not 
eligible for carbon leakage can submit the request through factors not belonging to the 
quantitative method. These criteria are specified in Article 10a (17) of the EU ETS Directive: 
❖ The ability of the sector to absorb costs indicated by Profit Margins 
                                                 
27 MARKUSEN J.R. (1975). International externalities and optimal tax structures. Journal of International 
Economics, 5, 15-29. 
28 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2015). Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments. 
2015/148. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2015:0337:FIN 
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❖ The characteristics of the sector, such as the competitive position relative to non-EU 
producers, homogeneity of the product, the market concentration and the bargaining 
power of the sector 
❖ The extent to which installations in the sector can reduce their electricity consumption 
or their greenhouse gas emissions through additional investments.   
It must be underlined that in reality companies relocate due a wide number of factors, which 
include, carbon costs. Other key variables include the demand of the market, the stability of 
investment conditions, labour costs and overall operational costs. Many studies are 
investigating the degree to which carbon leakage has actually taken place, or is likely to take 
place, as it is shown by Marcu et al. (2013)29. Among more than 150 UK sectors investigated, 
only few showed evidences of a loss in competitiveness under the EU ETS. The manufacturing 
of steel, aluminium, cement and clinker resulted to be the most exposed (Hourcade et al. 
2007)30. 
There is no evidence that carbon leakage has happened so far, as demonstrated by the Oko-
Institut (2013)31, and this is also due to the efforts already taken by the European Commission 
to address this problem. Given the limited supply of allowances the carbon cost is likely to keep 
on raising and hence, the situation must be kept under constant monitoring. The list of sectors 
affected by the carbon leakage risk is in continuous transformation and this also depends on the 
way in which different sectors manage the new carbon costs. 
 
2.2 Cost Pass-through in the power sector 
One of the main reasons of the small loss in competitiveness during the first phases of the EU 
ETS is that many sectors were able to pass costs related to the emission mechanism to 
costumers. The so-called cost pass-through defines a situation in which producers are able to 
increase the price of their products following an increase in producing costs. The power sector 
is one of the most polluting activity covered by the EU ETS and the sector that received the 
                                                 
29 MARCU A., EGENHOFER C., ROTH S. and STOEFS W. (2013). Carbon Leakage: An Overview. Centre for 
European policy Studies. CEPS Special Report 79. 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Special%20Report%20No%2079%20Carbon%20Leakage_0.pdf 
30 HOURCADE J.C., NEUHOFF K., DEMAILLY D. and SATO M. (2007). Differentiation and Dynamics of EU 
ETS Industrial Competitiveness Impacts. Climate Strategies, Cambridge. 
31 OKO-INSTITUT AND ECOFYS. (2013). Support to the Commission for the determination of the list sectors 
and subsectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage for the year 2015-2019. 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/allowances/leakage/docs/carbon_leakage_list_en.pdf 
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largest share of the allowances in the first two phases. It is also the segment in which the cost 
pass-through and subsequent windfall profits are more evident (Jouvet and Solier, 2013)32. 
In literature deep attention has been given to this phenomenon, in particular Bonacina and Gulli 
(2007)33 and Sijm at al. (2006)34 put the theoretical basis of the CO2 cost pass-through. The 
former explained it under imperfect competition, showing that the increase in electricity prices 
due to an increase to carbon prices is less than 100% when the market is characterized by 
imperfect competition; the latter determined that the pass-through level depends on many 
factors, such as the change in merit order due to CO2 costs and the demand elasticity. According 
to them under perfect competition the pass-through rate should be close to 100%. Other 
variables that could reduce the increase in electricity price are the presence of excess capacity 
and a low market share of the greatest polluter. 
These theoretical analyses have been followed by a great number of empirical studies that have 
evaluated the way in which the energy markets interact with the carbon markets during the first 
two phases of the EU Emission Trading System. Overall, three different approaches can be 
detected among the literature. The first type of analysis is characterized by the use of error-
correction models which are able to enlighten long-run cointegrating relationships between 
carbon prices, energy and electricity (e.g. Zachmann and Hirschhausen, 2008, among others)35. 
This is also the type of analysis that we will use in our work. The second tranche of studies used 
the Drivers approach (e.g. Hintermann, 2010, among others)36, showing that a relationship 
between energy prices and CO2 prices exists and is significant. A third approach tried to 
estimate directly the pass-through rate of carbon costs to electricity prices. One of the most 
relevant work belonging to this third group is the final report made by the Energy Research 
Centre of the Netherlands for the European Commission (Sijm et al. 2008)37. 
The overall conclusions of these studies are that the CO2 pass-through significantly occurred 
during the first two phases of EU ETS despite the fact that electricity producers received the 
allowances for free. Many factors can influence the level at which this happens: 
                                                 
32 JOUVET P. and SOLIER B. (2013). An overview of CO2 cost pass-through to electricity prices in Europe. 
Energy policy, 61, pp 1370-1376. 
33 BONACINA M., GULLI F. (2007). Electricity pricing under “carbon emissions trading”: a dominant firm with 
competitive fringe model. Energy Policy, 35, pp. 4200-4220. 
34 SIJM J, NEUHOFF K. and CHEN Y. (2006). CO2 cost pass-through and windfall profit in the power sector. 
Earthscan, Climate Policy, 6, pp. 49-72. 
35 ZACHMAN G., HIRSCHHAUSEN C. (2008) First evidence of asymmetric cost pass-through of EU emissions 
allowances: examining wholesale prices in Germany. Economics Letters, 99, pp. 465-469. 
36 HINTERMANN B. (2010). Allowance price drivers in the first phase of the EU ETS. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 59, pp. 43-56. 
37 SIJM J., HERS S.J., LISE W. and WETZELAER B.J.H.W. (2008). The impact of the EU ETS on electricity 
prices. Final report to DG environment of the European Commissions.  
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❖ The impact of allocation on power prices. Theoretically, there shouldn’t be any 
difference between various allocation methods. In reality free allocation may reduce the 
incentive to reduce CO2 emissions, leading to a higher need of emissions allowances 
and therefore to higher electricity prices. 
❖ The impact of market structure on power prices. This mainly depends on the shape of 
the demand curve (linear or not), the supply curve’s shape (constant or not constant 
marginal costs) and the market competitiveness. 
❖ Market strategy. The level of pass-through can also depend on whether the firms operate 
under profit maximization or pursuing other types of objectives, such as the 
maximization of sales revenues or market share. 
❖ Market regulation. Public authorities may try to limit the scope of windfall profits or 
directly regulate the electricity prices. 
❖ Market imperfections. Lack of information, risks and uncertainties may affect the level 
of cost pass-through.  
It must be underlined that the CO2 cost pass-through is perfectly rational. A producer, for 
instance, a power generator, can decide to use the allowances he owns either to sell them to 
other market participants or to cover its greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the electricity 
production. Hence, using an emission allowance represents the cost of not selling it and 
therefore it’s an opportunity cost. Consequently, in line with the optimal market behaviour and 
the economic theory, the cost of a CO2 allowance is expected to be included by the producers 
into their operational choices, which will result in a cost pass-through on the electricity 
wholesale market (whatever the way allowances are received). 
The passing-through on electricity prices is indeed efficient and in line with the objectives of 
the EU Emission Trading System (Sijm et al. 2008)38. In fact, in this way: 
❖ Consumers have the incentive to reduce their demand for carbon-generated electricity, 
increasing their electricity saving or switching to electricity generated by less CO2 
intensive sources. 
❖ Since the cost of the allowances is not totally shifted to consumers39, producers still 
have the incentive to reduce their emissions by investing in technologies with a lower 
emissions level, such as renewables or more efficient gas-fired plants. Besides, the shift 
                                                 
38 SIJM J., HERS S.J., LISE W. and WETZELAER B.J.H.W. (2008). The impact of the EU ETS on electricity 
prices. Final report to DG environment of the European Commissions. 
39 SIJM et AL (2008) found that 17 out of 22 countries investigated had a pass-through level between 38% and 
83% during the first phase. 
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in demand to less CO2 intensive generated electricity encourage producers to seek least 
cost abatement options. 
On the contrary, if the opportunity cost of carbon allowances is not internalized into power 
prices, there won’t be any incentive to approach low-emission options. The resulting CO2 price 
will be higher and hence, the overall cost of the EU ETS, as shown in Radov and Klevnas 
(2007)40. 
While the increase in the electricity price due to the pass-through of the CO2 cost is rational and 
intended, the same cannot be said to the windfall profits producers can achieve once they have 
received the allowances for free. During the first two phases of the EU ETS in fact, power 
producers have received most of the EUAs through free allocation, which, when combined with 
the cost pass-through, is more similar to receiving a lump-sum subsidy enhancing the 
profitability of these firms rather than actually facing a paid cost. The situation is described by 
the Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1. The pass-through of the opportunity cost of carbon allowances to power prices 
 
Source: J. SIJM, S. J. HERS, W. LISE, B.J.H.W. WETZELAER. The impact of the EU ETS on electricity prices. 
Final report to DG environment of the European Commissions. (2008). 
 
                                                 
40 RADOV D., KLEVNAS P. (2007). CO2 cost pass through: German Competition Regulators’ shaky economics. 
Energy Regulation Insight, 31, pp. 1-7. 
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Figure 2.1 represents the reference case, characterized by perfect competition, a straight upward 
sloping supply curve (S0) and an inelastic demand curve (D). It can be easily noted that the 
producer surplus is given by the area of the triangle abc, which corresponds to the difference 
between total revenues and total variable costs. After the introduction of the Emission Trading 
System, the opportunity costs of emission allowances are included in the production costs and 
the resulting supply curve shifts upward (S1). As already stated, under perfect competition the 
pass-through level is (close to) 100%: the price in fact shifts from P0 to P1, and the difference 
is equal to the change in the marginal production costs. In the case of auctioning, there is no 
change in the overall producer surplus which shifts to the area of the triangle def: it can be 
shown in fact that the size of the triangle abc and the new triangle def is the same. The 
quadrangle adfc represents the total emission costs which are fully passed on to the power 
consumers thanks to the increase in the electricity price. This area therefore also represents the 
loss in the consumer surplus consequent to the cost pass-through. However, when allowances 
are given for free, the cost is still passed through on the electricity price and the power producers 
are able to increase their surplus by the area of the quadrangle adfc. This higher producer surplus 
due to the EU Emission Trading System is commonly known as windfall profits resulting from 
grandfathering.  
The fact that the consumer surplus is decreased in favour of the producer one without any cost 
justification is a concern that has been widely addressed by policy makers, analysts and 
industrial stakeholders. The solution already taken by the European Commission mainly 
concerned the way in which emissions allowances were allocated from the third phase onwards.  
 
2.3 Allocation in the power sector 
The experience of the first two phases showed that the cost of the allowances was passed on the 
electricity prices even if EUAs were received for free. In order to address this problem, from 
phase 3 of the EU ETS, free allocation is no longer provided to power suppliers, who will have 
to buy allowances through auctioning as laid out in Article 10a(3) of the revised EU ETS 
Directive (2009)41. The power sector will be therefore subject to 100% auctioning from the 
third trading period onwards. Along with it, also many other industry sectors are supposed to 
see their free allocation level reduced from 2013. While in the first year of the third phase 80% 
                                                 
41 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community. 
Official Journal of the European Union, 140/63.  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:en:PDF 
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of the allowances will be allocated for free in the industrial sector, this value is meant to be 
reduced to 30% in 2020, with a view of 0% in 2027. Only sectors confirmed to be at risk of 
carbon leakage will continue to have 100% of the allowances received for free during the whole 
phase 3.  
 
Table 2.2. Share of free allocation calculated based on benchmarks per sector 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Electricity production 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Industry sectors 80% 72.9% 65.7% 58.6% 51.4% 44.2% 37.1% 30% 
Industry sectors deemed 
exposed to carbon leakage 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, (2011), General Guidance to the allocation methodology. 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/allowances/docs/gd1_general_guidance_en.pdf 
 
From 2013, allocation criteria are determined by the new EU-wide, fully harmonised rules, as 
specified in the Commission Decision 2011/278/EU42. An allocation plan, called the National 
Implementation Measures (NIMs), must be prepared by the participants of the EU ETS. In this 
document, Member States must specify all the detailed information about the allocations 
planned for every installation in the country. The required data are collected by Member States, 
the Commission is responsible for the approval or the rejection of the NIMs instead. Therefore, 
while the allocation rules are EU-wide, the number of allowances allocated to each individual 
installation is determined by the participants themselves.  
Despite the fact that the power sector is not entitled to receive any free allocation, the Directive 
still present some exceptions in order to support certain Member States in the modernisation of 
their electricity supply. It is in fact stated that, when some conditions are met, it is possible that 
the power sectors of these Member States can still receive a decreasing amount of free EUAs 
for a transitional period up to 2019. In return for transitional free allocation, these Member 
States must invest at least as much as the value of the allocations received in diversification of 
                                                 
42 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2011). Commission Decision of 27 April 2011 determining transitional Union-
wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a od Directive 2003/87/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council. Official Journal of the European Union, 130/1. 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/25d79153-02b6-4370-974c-2a45baf79167 
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their energy mix and in the modernisation of their electricity sector. In order to receive this 
temporary derogation from full auctioning, Member States must meet one of the condition 
specified in Article 10c(1) of the EU ETS Directive 2009/29/EC43: 
❖ In 2006, a single fossil fuel was responsible for more than 30% of the electricity 
production and the GDP per capita was not higher than 50% of the EU average; or 
❖ In 2007, the Member State had no conjunction to the electricity grid operated by the 
Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE); or 
❖ In 2007, the Member State had only one conjunction to the electricity grid operated by 
the UCTE with a capacity not superior than 400 MW. 
Besides, temporary free allocation can be provided only to installation of power production that 
were operational before 2009 or for which the investment procedure was already initiated 
before 2009.  
In order to make use of the derogation, eligible Member States must provide their chosen 
allocation methodology, individual allocations and a national plan about the investments in 
infrastructure and clean technologies to the Commission. In all other cases, the power sector is 
subject to 100% auctioning. 
 
2.4 Auctioning in the EU ETS 
Auctioning is a transparent allocation method which allows participants to acquire the emission 
allowances concerned at the market price. The timing, administration and other aspects of this 
allocation method from the phase 3 are specified in the Auctioning Regulation (No 
1031/2010)44. According to this disposition, auctioning should be a harmonised, open, 
transparent and non-discriminatory process. Any auction has to be open to any potential buyer 
in respect of the rules of the internal market. Each country has to guarantee that their share of 
allowances is auctioned.  
                                                 
43Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community. 
Official Journal of the European Union, 140/63.  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:en:PDF 
 
44 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 of 12 November 2010 on the timing, administration and other 
aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowances trading within the 
Community. Official Journal of the European Union, 302/1.  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:302:0001:0041:EN:PDF 
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From the third phase, allowances can be auctioned either on a common auction platform 
through a joint procurement procedure or on an ‘opt-out’ auction platform. The European 
Commission and 25 Member States use the joint procurement approach. Poland, UK and 
Germany decided to opt-out instead, having their own auction platform. The main auction 
platforms of the EU ETS are listed in the following table. 
 
Table 2.3. Auction calendars 
Auction Platform States Auction timing 
EEX 
25 Participating Member States/ 
EEA EFTA States 
Weekly auctions on Mondays, 
Tuesdays and Thursdays 
EEX Germany Weekly auctions on Fridays 
ICE United Kingdom 
Fortnightly auctions on 
Wednesdays 
EEX Poland 
Monthly auctions on 
Wednesdays 
 
Source: EC webpage about EU ETS Auctioning. 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/auctioning_en#tab-0-0 
 
The European Energy Exchange AG (EEX) is the auction platform where 25 Member States 
buy and sell their allowances, and is also, separately, the opt-out common auction platform for 
Germany. Poland still has to list its opt-out auction platform, so it temporary uses the European 
Energy Exchange platform. UK uses its own auction platform, the ICE Futures Europe (ICE). 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway also use the transitional EEX. Once the Commission has 
been consulted, auction calendars are fixed as soon as possible to provide certainty to the 
market. The auctioning of allowances on opt-out auction platforms is held separately from the 
common auction platform. 
The article 10(2) of the EU ETS Directive (2009/29/EC)45 specifies how auctioning rights are 
distributed, data are summarized in figure 2.2. First, 5% of the total quantity of allowances is 
stored in the New Entrant Reserve (NER); EUAs in this reserve are given for free to new 
entrants. In case allowances in this reserve are not allocated, they are distributed to the other 
                                                 
45 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the 
Community. Official Journal of the European Union, 140/63.  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:en:PDF 
 
24 The impact of CO2 cost on the Italian electricity price. A VECM analysis 
 
participants for auctioning. Member States also receive 88% of the total amount of allowances 
that can be auctioned. The distribution among countries is based on their share of GHG 
emissions in the first phase of the EU ETS. A further 10% of the auctioning rights is meant to 
be divided between low per capita income States. In this way, Member States with lower per 
capita income are able to invest in climate-friendly technologies through the additional auction 
revenues they receive. The remaining 2% of auction rights is given to those countries which 
had already achieved a reduction of at least 20% in GHG emissions by 2005, compared with 
the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol. Only nine Member States were able to achieve 
this benefit: Slovakia, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic 
and Bulgaria. If in a Member State some free allocation is provided to electricity producers 
according to Article 10c (2009/29/EC), the equivalent number of allowances will be deducted 
from the auctioning right of that participant. 
 
 
2.4.1 Auctioning in practice 
The auction format is a single-round, sealed bid46 and uniform-price auction. During a single 
bidding, any number of bids with a size of 500 or 1000 allowances can be submitted, modified 
or withdrew by the bidders. The number of allowances the participant would like to buy at a 
given price must be specified in each bid. The bidding period has to last at least 2 hours, at the 
                                                 
46 A sealed-bid auction is a type of auction process in which all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids to the 
platform. In this way, no bidder knows how much the others have bid. The winner of the bidding process is usually 




Based on the share of GHG in Phase 1 Low per Capita Income Virtuous Member States
Figure 2.2. The distribution of Actioning rights, once 5% of the total quantity is set aside in the NER 
EU ETS and the Power Sector         25 
 
end of which the auction platform will determine and communicate the clearing price. This is 
the price at which the sum of volumes bid is higher or equal the volumes of allowances 
auctioned by Member States. A bid is successful if it’s higher than the clearing price. Bid 
volumes are then allocated starting from the highest bid, in descending order. 
Before the auction takes place, the auction platform sets a secret minimum clearing price in 
close consultation with the auction monitor, based on the predominant market price for EUAs 
before the bidding window. If the clearing price results to be below the auction reserve price, 
the auction is cancelled. This prevents the transmission of distortive carbon price signals. When 
the bidding volume is lower than the available volume for auction, the auction is also cancelled. 
In these cases, the auctioned volumes will be distributed over the next auctions on the same 
platform. 
In the Auctioning Regulation the emission allowances are described as ‘spot’ products with a 
maximum delivery date of five days after the auction has taken place. Allowances are delivered 
one day after the auction in the EEX and ICE platforms47. In reality, under EU financial market 
legislation, these products do not belong to the ‘financial instruments’ category. Nevertheless, 
as regards customer protection, money laundering and market abuse, the protections in place 
are similar to those of any financial instruments covered by the European legislation, as it is 
ensured in the Auctioning Regulation. 
As far as the auction revenues is concerned, in the Article 10(3) of the EU Directive 
(2009/29/EC)48 it is established that “Member States shall determine the use of revenues 
generated by the auctioning of allowances”. Moreover, it’s also specified that at least 50% of 
these revenues should be used in investments that aim to combat climate change in the EU and 
third countries. A list of types of actions is also suggested by the Directive in the article 3d(4).  
 
  
                                                 
47 EEX EU Emissions Auctions overview: https://www.eex.com/en/products/environmental-markets/emissions-
auctions/overview 
ICE EUA product overview: https://www.theice.com/products/197/EUA-Futures/specs 
48 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the 
Community. Official Journal of the European Union, 140/63.  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:en:PDF 
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3. The Italian Power Market 
 
In 1962 the Italian electricity sector was nationalized with the creation of ENEL, a state-
controlled entity with a monopoly on production. The nationalization, which followed a 
tendency spreading all over Europe, was seen as the only way to efficiently supply electricity 
given the monopoly nature of this sector. The new company faced a rapid growth in the 
electricity demand during the subsequent years, which it met with fossil-fuel powered plants. 
However, the 1980s were characterized by the reversed belief that more efficiency could be 
reached through private companies. The European Directive 96/92/EC49, outlined the common 
rules for the privatization in the electricity markets. It suggests the implementation of different 
regulations for production and transmission: the former should be managed by private 
companies while the latter, being a natural monopoly, should be under the State regulation. 
The European Directive was then transposed in the Italian national legislation through the 
legislative decree 79/199950. The decree established the necessary steps for a gradual transition 
towards a complete liberalization of the market. A new company, Terna (the Italian TSO), 
became responsible for the management of the network. Moreover, a limit has been set on 
Enel’s property share of Terna at 20%.  
In 2003, a new European Directive, 2003/54/EC51, and a subsequent Italian decree, aimed at a 
free electricity trading for all commercial clients from July 2004 and, a complete opening of 
the market for private costumers from July 2007. 
In Figure 3.1, market share of companies in the Italian power sector in 2015 are shown. It can 
be easily noted that the national incumbent still has the highest share. Besides, 50% of the Italian 
power generation is produced by the first six operators. 
                                                 
49 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity. Official Journal of the European Union, 27. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31996L0092 
50Decreto legislative 16 marzo 1999, n.79, attuazione della direttiva 96/92/CE recante norme comuni per il mercato 
interno dell’energia elettrica. Gazzetta Ufficiale, 75. http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/99079dl.htm 
51Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC – Statements made with regard to 
decommissioning and waste management activities. Official Journal of the European Commission, 176. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003L0054 
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Figure 3.1 Electricity production market share in 2015 
 
Source: the 2016 AEEGSI Annual Report 
 
3.1 The Italian Power Exchange (IPEX) 
In 2005, after the liberalization of the demand side bidding, the Italian wholesale electricity 
market begun to operate as an Exchange. Italian power, gas and environmental markets are 
conducted by Gestore dei Mercati Energetici S.p.A. (GME). Following the process of 
liberalization, GME rules the management and the economic organization of the wholesale 
Power Market under principles of competition, objectivity, transparency and neutrality. GME’s 
activities are carried out under the provisions set by Autorità per Energia e Ambiente (ARERA) 
and under the guidelines given by the Ministry of Economic Development. 
The Italian Power Exchange (IPEX) is the power market platform and it is directly managed by 
GME. It is the place where producers and sellers can buy and sell wholesale electricity. As far 
as the power is concerned, there are four sub-markets: 
❖ MTE (mercato a termine). A forward physical market, 
❖ MPEG (mercato dei prodotti giornalieri). A market where daily products are traded with 
continuous trading mode, 
❖ MGP (mercato del giorno prima). A day-ahead auction market and 
❖ MI (mercato infragiornaliero). An intraday auction market based on five sessions. 
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Figure 3.2. Traded power volumes for Italy on forward and spot markets 
 
Source: Gestore Mercati Energetici 
 
GME also operates a platform for the registration of OTC transactions (PCE) where contracts 
concluded outside the IPEX are registered. The parties involved have to record their obligations 
and put up the related electricity withdrawal and injection implied in the contract. As it can be 
noticed from Figure 3.2, in 2014 and 2015 there was a boom of volumes traded Over-the-
Counter in markets different from the MTE. Besides, from 2015 the volumes traded on the 
Italian forward electricity market almost double those exchanged on spot markets. 
Gestore dei Mercati Energetici is also a member of the Price Coupling of Regions (PCR), a 
European project which aims at providing technical support for the coupling of European day-
ahead markets. 
In 2009 GME also became the superintendent, on an exclusive basis, of natural-gas markets 
and associated services. The provisions are contained in Law no. 99 of the 23 July 200952. The 
Gas Trading Platform (P-GAS) and the Wholesale Gas Market (MGAS) belong to GME’s gas 
markets. 
Besides, GME is also concerned in the implementation of environmental policies through the 
management and organization of environmental markets, such as the Guarantee-of-Origin (GO) 
                                                 
52 Law No. 99 of July 23, 2009 containing Provisions for the Development and Internationalization of 
Enterprises and Energy. Ordinary Supplement to Official Journal, 176. https://www.oecd-
nea.org/law/legislation/italy-primary-legislation.pdf 
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Market and the Energy Efficiency Certificates Market. Lastly, GME is responsible for the 
market monitoring of the Italian power Market.  
 
3.2 Market overview 
As far as the market size is concerned, the Italian electricity market is fourth in the European 
electricity market ranking, while the Italian Gas market stands third. In figure 3.3 it is shown 
that in 2016 the Italian power demand was about 290 TWh (almost half of the power demand 
of Germany, the country with the highest demand). The Italian electricity demand is mainly 
driven by the Industry sector (about 42% of the total), directly followed by the services sector 
(35%), while the agriculture sector is responsible for the smallest amount instead (2% of the 
total)53. 
 
Figure 3.3. European Electricity Demand in 2016 
 
Source: HIS Cera, Snam Rete Gas and Terna 
*Power demand data do not include losses 
                                                 
53 Source: the AEEGSI 2016 annual report, Terna, Eurostat 
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Despite the fact that the Italian Demand is much lower than the Germany and France’s ones, 
Italy is characterized by the highest Baseload electricity price. One of the main causes of this 
phenomenon is the Italian electricity production mix. While other countries strongly rely on 
some less-expensive sources of production, such as Nuclear Power, Italy’s production is mainly 
based on fossil-fuel power stations and, as a consequence, the electricity price is higher. 
 
Figure 3.4. Baseload electricity prices 
 
Source: HIS Cera, Snam Rete Gas and Terna 
 
In fact, as can be noted from the graph, while the prices of Germany and France are close to 
each other, the Italian electricty price tends to be slighly higher in a consistent way. Besides, 
there is a trend of heavy decrease in prices since 2008 and this is probably due to generation 
overcapacity. Bonenti et al. (2013)54 underline in their work that the decrease in price is also 
partially due to a shift to renewable sources, particullarly evident from 2013 (the year of the 
begginning of Phase 3 of the EU ETS). With the introduction of a 100% auctioning allocating 
system for the electricity market, the EU Emission Trading System incentived European 
countries, including Italy, to invest in power stations not based on fossil-fuel. This is the proof 
that the EU ETS is properly working, obtaining the results it was meant for. 
                                                 
54 BONENTI F., OGGIONI G., ALLEVI A. and MARANGONI G. (2013). Evaluating the EU ETS impacts on 
profits, investments and prices on the Italian electricity market. Energy Policy, 59, pp. 242-256. 
32 The impact of CO2 cost on the Italian electricity price. A VECM analysis 
 
In Figure 3.5 we will report the Italian electricity production mix from 2003 to 2015. It can be 
easily noted that the main source of production is Natural Gas, directly followed by 
hydroelectric production. 
 
Figure 3.5. Electricity production mix 
 
Source: Terna and AEEGSI annual report 2016 
 
The first thing the graph enlightens is the presence of a stable share of coal and hydroelectric 
productions. Besides, Natural Gas production is quite steady and it occupies the first place in 
terms of share size in the Italian production mix. Oil and renewables production fractions are 
characterized by opposite trends: the former decreases over time (from 28% in 2003 to 7% in 
2015), the latter increases instead (from 4% in 2003 to 22% in 2015). This is the direct impact 
of the incentives resulting from the EU Emission Trading System. From 2014 the increase in 
renewables sources has slowed down due to lower incentives in the sector provided by the 
Italian Government. Despite this fact, in 2015, the sum of hydroelectric power and other 
renewables, accounts for almost 40% of the Italian total production. 
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More precisely, the main sources of renewable productions in 2015 are: 
❖ 40% hydropower, 
❖ 21% solar, 
❖ 16% wind, 
❖ 17% biomass, 
❖ 6% geothermal. 
According to Terna, the fall in the electricity price caused by the shift to renewable sources will 
be partially off-set by a slight increase in the demand which will characterize the market in the 
forthcoming years. The increase in demand is forecasted to go from 0.4% to 0.9% per year. 
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4. The Statistical Framework 
 
When analysing price time series, deep attention must be given to the characteristics of the 
series, checking whether they meet all the criteria for a meaningful econometric analysis. Given 
the nature of our data, we expect them to show evidences of presence of unit roots, a problem 
that indeed must be addressed. For this reason, in the first part of this chapter we will explore 
the characteristics and qualities of the time series we are going to analyse while, in the second 
part, we will describe the most suitable model for our work: the Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM). 
 
4.1 Stationary and non-stationary processes 
As mentioned by Manuca and Savit, (1996)55, the problem of non-stationarity is one of the most 
challenging problems in time series analysis. Many methods that analyze time series assume 
that the series under investigation are characterized by stationarity. This would grant the 
correctness of the interpretation of the results.  
Economic time series are often non-stationary instead, and, as a result, they are unpredictable 
and can be hardly modeled or forecasted. A non-stationary time series is a process that violates 
at least one of the conditions of (weak) stationarity, which are: 
 
 𝐸(𝑌𝑡) = 𝜇 
 
(4.1) 
 𝑉(𝑌𝑡) = 𝐸((𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇)
2) = 𝛾0 
 
(4.2) 




These can be violated in different ways. Examples of non-stationary processes are reported in 
figure 4.1. Using non-stationary data may produce spurious results which indicate the presence 
of meaningful relationships when there are none. In contrast with stationary variables, non-
                                                 
55 MANUCA R. and SAVIT R. (1996). Stationarity and nonstationarity in time series analysis. Psysica D, 99, 
pp. 134-161. 
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stationary processes don’t revert around a constant long-term mean and are characterized by a 




Examples of non-stationary processes are: 
❖ Pure Random Walk (Yt=Yt-1 + εt). It is a non-mean reverting process that can move 
away from the mean either in a negative or positive direction. The variance also evolves 
over time, increasing as the time goes to infinity. 
❖ Random Walk with Drift (Yt=α+Yt-1 + εt). The value at time t is equal to the value of 
the last period plus a constant, called drift, and the white noise term. For this reason, the 
variance depends on time and the process doesn’t revert to a long-run mean. 
❖ Deterministic trend (Yt=α+βt+εt). Differently from random walks, a non-stationary 
process which presents a deterministic trend has a mean that grows around a fixed trend, 
which is independent of time and constants. 
❖ Random walk with Drift and Deterministic Trend (Yt=α+Yt-1 + βt + εt). This process 
specifies that the value at time t is given by the stochastic component, the trend, a drift 
and the last period’s value. 
Figure 4.1. Examples of non-stationary processes. 
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This latter process is also better known as a unit-root process. If a time series is characterized 
by unit roots, it shows a systematic pattern that is unpredictable (Granger and Swanson, 1997)56. 
This indeed causes a problem of non-stationarity which, however, can be solved through a series 
of successive differences d, with which the time series is transformed into a stationary process.  
Non-stationary processes that can be converted in this way are called series integrated of order 
k. Economic time series are usually of the order of integration of 0 or 1; it’s rare to see higher 
orders of integration. 
 
An I(0) time series is therefore a non-integrated (stationary) process. Davidson (2009)57, states 
that it is possible to define an I(0) process as a specific condition that make the asymptotic 
theory valid. Analytically, a stochastic process is said to be integrated of order 0 or I(0) if 
 
 𝑦𝑡 = ∑ ᴪ𝑗 𝑡−𝑗 = ᴪ(𝐿) 𝑡
∞
𝑗=0        is s.t. ᴪ(1) ≠ 0 (4.4) 
 
                                                 
56 GRANGER C.W.J and SWANSON N.R. (1997). An introduction to stochastic unit-root processes. Journal of 
Econometrics, 80, pp. 35-62. 
57 DAVIDSON J. (2009). When is a Time Series I(0)? In The Methodology and Practice of Econometrics. 
Oxford University Press, available at http://people.exeter.ac.uk/jehd201/WhenisI0.pdf 
Figure 4.2. An example of I(1) process. 
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A stochastic process is said to be integrated of order d or I(d) if xt 
 
 (1 − 𝐿)𝑑𝑦𝑡 = ∆
𝑑𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡  is s.t. 𝑥𝑡~𝐼(0) 
 
(4.5) 
The presence of a unit root does not automatically imply that the series is I(1), a further 
requirement is that the series in difference is I(0). As specified by Phillips (1952)58, linear 
regression between I(1) series usually don’t have much sense, that’s the reason why they are 
called spurious regressions. But when the series show a common trend, it’s possible that even 
if they are I(1), their linear combination is stationary. This is the so-called cointegration, firstly 
introduced by Engle and Granger (1987)59. 
 
4.2 Cointegration 
As already stated, regressions based on non-stationary processes can lead to spurious results. 
This can be noted from values close to zero of the DW and R2 statistics. But, if there exists a 
stationary linear combination of the nonstationary processes the problem can be solved; in this 
case, the variables combined are said to be cointegrated. 
Definition. A vector of k time series yt with 𝑦𝑡~𝐼(1), i = 1,2, …, k, is said to be cointegrated 
if exists a vector β with k dimension such that 
 




If the linear combination of the elements of yt with weights equal to β is integrated of order 0 
we are in presence of cointegration, indicated as 𝑦𝑡~𝐶𝐼(1,1). Even if the definition can be 
generalized, the case CI(1,1) is sufficient for our analysis. 
The vector β is called vector of cointegration while the relationship 𝛽′𝑦𝑡 is called cointegrating 
relationship or regression. The economic theory usually suggests useful rationales for finding 
relationships of cointegration. I(1) time series with a long-run equilibrium relationship cannot 
drift too far apart from the equilibrium because economic forces will operate to restore the 
                                                 
58PHILLIPS P.C.B. (1986). Understanding Spurious Regressions in Econometrics. Journal of 
Econometrics, 33, pp: 311-340. 
59 ENGLE R.F. and GRANGER W.J. (1987). Co-integration and error correction: Representation, 
estimation and testing. Econometrica. 55: pp. 251–276. 
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equilibrium relationship. For example, money supply and price level are typically integrated of 
order one while their difference should be stationary in the long run as, according to economic 
principles, money supply and price level cannot diverge in the long-run. Besides, a graphical 
representation of the time series can provide evidences of cointegration. In Figure 4.3 an 
example of two cointegrating processes is showed. 
 




The cointegration vector β is not unique since for any scalar c, the linear combination 𝑐𝛽′𝑌𝑡 =
𝛽∗′𝑌𝑡~𝐼(0). Hence, some normalization assumption is needed to uniquely identify the 
parameter β. The most common normalization is 
 





So that we can express the cointegrating relationship as 
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 𝑦1,𝑡 = 𝛽2𝑦2,𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑦𝑛,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡         𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑢𝑡~𝐼(0) 
 
(4.9) 
Generally, with k component in yt there can be 0 < r < k cointegrating relationships. Given the 
vector of k dimension yt, with a rank of cointegration r, the k series share (k-r) common trend. 
 
4.3 The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
Engle and Granger (1987)60 showed that cointegration implies the presence of the so-called 
Error Correction Model (ECM). For example, in a bivariate case of cointegrated vectors, the 
model can be written in the form 
 
 ∆𝑦1,𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝛼1(𝑦1,𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑦2,𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝜑11
𝑗
𝑗
∆𝑦1,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝜑12
𝑗
𝑗




 ∆𝑦2,𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝛼2(𝑦1,𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑦2,𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝜑21
𝑗
𝑗
∆𝑦1,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝜑22
𝑗
𝑗




These equations describe the dynamic behavior of y1t and y2t. The ECM has the great property 
of linking the long-run equilibrium relationship which derives from the cointegration with the 
short-run dynamic adjustment mechanism that show how the variables respond when they move 
out of the long-run equilibrium. This is the reason why the Error Correction Model is 
particularly useful in modelling financial time series. 
The author of the model also developed a simple two-step residual-based testing procedure for 
identifying presence of cointegration when there is at most one cointegrating vector. Limits of 
this procedure come from the fact that it considers only one cointegrating vector, for this reason, 
in our work, we used the method developed by Johansen (1988)61. With the Johansen’s 
technique 0 ≤ r < n cointegrating vectors are possible and the cointegrating relationship is 
                                                 
60 ENGLE R.F. and GRANGER W.J. (1987). Co-integration and error correction: Representation, 
estimation and testing. Econometrica. 55: pp. 251–276. 
61 JOHANSEN S. (1988). Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors. Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, 12, pp. 231-254.  
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identified through a sophisticated sequential procedure. Besides, Johansen has the merit of 
having linked cointegration and error correction models in a vector autoregression framework. 
If we consider a vector of I(1) variables Yt, we can say that the vector is cointegrated if there is 
a linear combination of the variables in Yt which is I(0). In this case, a VAR representation is 
no more the most appropriate for the analysis because the cointegration relationships are not 
explicit. If the set of variables is found to have one or more cointegrating vectors, then a useful 
representation is the so-called Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), developed by Johansen 




















Hence, the VECM representation contains both I(1) terms, Yt-1, and both I(0) terms, which 
correspond to ∆𝑦𝑡 and its lags. Consequently, it is necessary that 𝛱𝑦𝑡−1~𝐼(1) to have 
∆𝑦𝑡~𝐼(0). This is only possible if the cointegration relationship is contained in 𝛱𝑦𝑡−1. 
Recalling that r is the number of cointegration relationships and k is the number of variables in 
the vector Yt, we can distinguish three cases: 
❖ rank(𝜫) = 𝒌. There is no cointegration since the time series are not integrated. 
❖ rank(𝜫) = 𝟎. The VECM form is reduced to a VAR model in difference. The starting 
time series are integrated but there is not cointegration among them. A model in 
difference is sufficient for the analysis. 
                                                 
62 JOHANSEN S. (1955). Likelihood-Based inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Models. 
Oxford University Press. 
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❖ 0 < rank(𝜫) < k. This is the most interesting case where 𝑦𝑡~𝐼(1) and r vectors of 
cointegration exist. Therefore there are r linear combination of yt that are I(0). 
If rank(𝛱) = r < k, the matrix rank 𝛱 can be factorized 
 
 𝛱 = 𝛼𝛽′ 
 
(4.15) 











where 𝛽′𝑦𝑡−1~𝐼(0) and the matrix β contains the r vectors of cointegration. α is the matrix of 
the adjustment factors, which indicate the adjustment speed towards the equilibrium. To 
identify exactly the parameters α and β, normalizations and restrictions are needed. 
As we already mentioned, there are several different frameworks for estimation and inference 
in cointegrating system. In this paper we will mainly use methods based on the maximum 
likelihood (ML) methods developed by Johansen. His procedure can be summarized in the 
following steps: 
❖ Estimate a VAR model of order p for Yt, 
❖ Obtain and evaluate the rank of the matrix 𝛱 to identify the number of cointegrating 
relationships r, 
❖ Decide which normalization restrictions to impose (if necessary) on the cointegration 
vectors, 
❖ Estimate the VECM. 
 
Johansen developed a test, called the Johansen test of cointegration, that allows to easily 
identify the rank of the matrix and obtain the number of cointegrating relationship. Besides, he 
showed in his work the properties of the estimators of the model: 
❖ The β estimator is super-consistent 
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❖ The β estimator has a non-standard distribution equal to a mixture of normal 
distributions 
❖ The properties of the β estimator allow inference on the parameters included in β 
through usual tests which have a χ2 asymptotic distribution 
❖ Also ?̂?(𝛽) has an asymptotic distribution and therefore standard inference is feasible. 
 












Where δ is a K x 1 vector of parameters. Since this model is based on the differences of the 
variables, the constant implies a linear time trend in the levels, while the time trend δt implies 
a quadratic time trend in the levels of the data. Often, we may want to include a constant or a 
linear time trend in the differences without allowing for the higher-order trend that is implied 
in levels. VECMs exploit the properties of the matrix α to achieve this flexibility. 
For this purpose, the deterministic components can be redefined as 
 
 𝑣 = 𝛼𝜇 + 𝛾 
 
(4.18) 
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Placing restriction on the trend terms of this equation allow us to obtain five distinct cases: 
CASE 1: No constant, τ = 0, ρ = 0, 𝛾 = 0 and µ = 0 
This specification assumes that there are no nonzero means or trend. It also 
assumes that the cointegrating equations are stationary with zero mean and that 
the differences and the levels of the data have zero mean. This case is unlikely 
to occur with economic time series. 
CASE 2: Restricted constant, τ = 0, ρ = 0 and 𝛾 = 0 
With these restrictions, we assume that there are no linear time trends in the 
levels of the data. This specification allows the cointegration equations to be 
stationary around a constant mean, but it allows no other trends or constant 
terms. As we will show below, this is the case of interest in our study. 
CASE 3: Unrestricted constant, τ = 0 and ρ = 0 
In this way, we exclude the possibility that the levels of the data have quadratic 
trends, and we restrict the cointegrating equations to be stationary around a 
constant mean. Since 𝛾 is not restricted to 0, this specification still puts a linear 
time trend in the levels. 
CASE 4: Restricted trend, τ = 0 
By setting τ = 0, we are assuming that the trends in the levels are linear (around 
a constant) but not quadratic. This specification allows the cointegrating 
equations to be trend stationary. 
CASE 5: Unrestricted constant and trend 
If no restrictions are placed on the trend parameters, (4.20) implies that there are 
quadratic trends in levels of the variables and that the cointegrating equations are 
stationary around a time trend.  
  
In the following figures, a graphical representation of these cases is showed. 
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Figure 4.4. Simulated Yt from bivariate cointegrated VECM for five trend cases 
 
 Source: https://faculty.washington.edu/ezivot/econ584/notes/cointegration.pdf 
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5. The Empirical Analysis 
 
Our study examines the pass-through of CO2 cost on the Italian Electricity price. In the first 
two phases of the EU Emission Trading System, power producers passed the cost of the 
emission allowances on the electricity price, even if EUAs were received for free. For this 
reason, in the third phase, 100% of the allocation to the power market is subject to auctioning.  
In this dissertation we aim at assessing the new pass-through level in the Phase 3 and the 
magnitude of this phenomenon in the Italian market which has one of the highest final 
electricity price in Europe.  
After a brief description of the data, we will conduct some analysis on our time series, in 
particular checking whether they present unit roots and are therefore non-stationary. This will 
allow us to decide which type of model fits best our work: if no evidence of non-stationarity is 
found, a VAR model is sufficient; if, however, our processes prove to be non-stationary, 
cointegration models must be considered. 
 
5.1 Data 
As we wish to measure the effect of a change in the price of the allowances to the Italian 
electricity price, these two are the first two series of data we need. We also decided to add the 
Natural Gas price to our model, as a control variable, since it is the main source used in the 
electricity production. Our model will therefore analyse the interconnections between three 
different time series from 2012 to the end of 2017. 
As a proxy for the wholesale power price in Italy, we considered the PUN (Prezzo Unico 
Nazionale), which is traded in the MGP, the Italian Day-Ahead Market. In the MGP the power 
selling price differs according on the zone, the purchase offers are valued at a single national 
price instead: the PUN, which is simply an average of the zonal prices, weighted to the total 
purchases. The price is determined by the match of supply and demand and it’s hourly, for this 
reason we transformed it into a daily price through a weighted average with the total volumes 
exchanged. In fact, all prices in our study are settlement prices observed with daily frequency, 
from Monday to Friday. Data are retrieved directly from the GME’s webpage63, since they are 
public for the sake of transparency and objectivity. 
                                                 
63 http://www.mercatoelettrico.org/It/Default.aspx 
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EUA futures prices are obtained from the European Climate Exchange (EEX), the most liquid 
platform for this type of products64. EEX futures contracts, in €/ton, have been traded since 
April 2005 and have physical settlement. The underlying instrument is represented by EUAs, 
and each contract represents 1,000 emission allowances. The methodology for the 
establishment of daily settlement prices on the EEX contracts is described directly in the 
exchange’s webpage65. Data were then practically obtained from the Thomson Reuters Eikon 
DataStream. 
In additional to the EUAs prices, our dataset includes Italian PSV (Punto di Scambio Virtuale) 
natural gas future prices, from the ICE Exchange. Contracts are for delivery or purchase through 
the transfer of rights in respect of natural gas at the Punto di Scambio Virtuale (Virtual Trading 
Point – PSV) organized and managed by Snam Rete Gas. All the detailed information is 
available at the exchange’s webpage66. Data were then practically obtained from the Thomson 
Reuters Eikon DataStream. 
Table 5.1 provides summary statistics of all the variables. 
 
Table 5.1. Summary statistics 
Variable Sample 
Period 
Unit Obs Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurthosis 
PUN 01/01/2012-
31/12/2017 
€/MWh 1565 60.3191 15.0848 0.7207 4.4965 
Gas 01/01/2012-
31/12/2017 
€/MWh 1565 22.8079 4.9195 -0.1612 1.9227 
EUA 01/01/2012-
31/12/2017 
€/ton 1565 6.1578 1.3668 0.0565 1.9833 
 
For our purpose, also a graphical representation of the data is useful. Traces of non-stationarity 
can in fact be detected in this way. All variables have been transformed into natural logarithms. 
                                                 
64 Approximately 96% of the volume of futures contracts is traded on this exchange. CHEVALLIER J. (2010). 
Modelling risk premia in CO2 allowances spot and futures prices. Economic Modelling, 27, pp. 717-729. 
65 https://www.eex.com/en/products/environmental-markets/emissions-auctions/archive 
66 https://www.theice.com/products/49321531/Italian-PSV-Natural-Gas-Futures 
The Empirical Analysis          49 
 
Figure 5.1. Graphical representation of our time series. 
 
 
The three variables of our model seem to be correlated and potentially I(1) processes. We will 
therefore investigate the presence of unit roots and of cointegrating relationships. 
 
5.2 Methodology 
As underlined by many authors, Lo Prete and Norman (2013) among others67, energy prices are 
typically non-stationary variables: misleading values of R2, Durbin–Watson and t statistics can 
be obtained from the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  The standard inference is not valid and 
this may lead the researcher to find meaningful relationships when in reality there is none. One 
possible solution to this problem is differencing the time series one or more times. This would 
resolve the invalidity of the OLS but at the same time information on the long-run relationship 
could be lost. 
That’s why we decided to apply the Vector Error Correction Model, previously described, 
which has the great merit of adjusting to both short and run changes in variables and deviations 
from the equilibrium. As we already mentioned in Chapter 4, we will use the method developed 
                                                 
67 LO PRETE C., NORMAN C.S. (2013). Rockets and feathers in power future markets? Evidence 
from the second phase of the EU ETS. Energy Economics, 36, pp. 312-321. 
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by Johansen based on the maximum likelihood (ML). Remember that this procedure can be 
summarized in the following steps: 
❖ Estimate a VAR model of order p for Yt, 
❖ Obtain and evaluate the rank of the matrix 𝛱 to identify the number of cointegrating 
relationships r, 
❖ Decide which normalization restrictions to impose (if necessary) on the cointegration 
vectors, 
❖ Estimate the VECM. 
Before applying the methodology proposed, we firstly want to check if the time series are 
actually I(1) processes, as we expect. This can be done generally checking the graphical 
representation of the data and through the implementation of the so-called unit root tests. In this 
work we used the GLS Dickey-Fuller (DF-GLS) test68, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test69, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test70 and the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) 
test71. In fact, since these tests are known for having low statistical power, the application of 
more than one test is strongly suggested. The null hypothesis is generally defined as the 
presence of a unit root and the alternative hypothesis is either stationarity, trend stationarity or 
explosive root depending on the test used. The KPSS test has a null hypothesis of trend 
stationarity rather than the presence of a unit root.  
The literature specify that some tests have more power than others, for example the DF-GLS 
test proposed by Elliott is similar to the ADF test but firstly transforms the actual series via 
generalized least-squares (GLS) regression.  
In order to check the consistency of the results of the unit root tests, we performed every 
mentioned test on each variable. For the sake of synthesis, we will report in the table 5.2 only 
the result of the KPSS test, while all the other values can be found in the appendix72. The 
optimal lag selection has been chosen through the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Using 
other types of information criteria did not influence the results of the tests. 
                                                 
68 ELLIOT G.R., ROTHENBERG T.J., and STOCK J.H. (1996). Efficient tests for an autoregressive unit root. 
Econometrica, 64: pp. 813–836. 
69 DICKEY D.A. and FULLER W.A. (1979). Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time series with a 
unit root. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, pp. 427–431. 
70 PHILLIPS P.C.B., and PERRON P. (1988). Testing for a unit root in time series regression. Biometrika, 75, pp. 
335–346. 
71 KWIATKOWSKI D., PHILLIPS P.C.B., SCHMIDT P., and SHIN Y. (1992). Testing the null hypothesis of 
stationarity against the alternative of a unit root: How sure are we that economic time series have a unit root? 
Journal of Econometrics, 54, pp. 159–178 
72 Appendix A. The unit root tests 
The Empirical Analysis          51 
 
Table 5.2. KPSS test 
VARIABLE LAG TEST STATISTIC REJECT H0 
LOGPUN 3 14.7 Yes 
LOGEUA 2 2.88 Yes 
LOGGAS 3 27 yes 
 
In all cases the test has been run around a constant with no trend. The rejection refers to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of stationarity at a 10% confidence level. 
 
All the three variables reject the null hypothesis of stationarity at a 10% confidence level. The 
consistency of this result is supported by the other unit root test, whose values can be found in 
the appendix73. This suggests that the time series considered could be integrated process of 
order one. For completeness, we therefore decided to check whether the variables in first 
difference don’t show any evidence of presence of unit roots. For this purpose, we applied the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the differenced series. In table 5.3, the results of this test are 
reported. 
 
Table 5.3. Unit root test on the differenced variables 
VARIABLE LAG TEST STATISTIC ACCEPT H0 
D.LOGPUN 2 -33.463 No 
D.LOGEUA 2 -25.263 No 
D.LOGGAS 3 -19.920 No 
 
In all cases the test has been run without the trend option and the lag length follows the AIC. In the ADF test the 
H0 refers to the presence of a unit root with a 10% confidence level. 
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As it is shown in the table, with all the three variables we reject the null hypothesis of presence 
of a unit root in favor of the alternative. The processes therefore are stationary in first difference. 
We are now able to apply the Johansen procedure, seeking for cointegrating relationships 
among the variables. More precisely, we will apply the Johansen test of cointegration (Johansen 
1991)74, which, through the estimation of the rank of the matrix assesses the number of 
cointegrating relationships. This test is more generally applicable than the Engle-Granger test 
because it permits more than one relationship of cointegration.  
In this test, there are two possible test statistics, the trace statistic or the maximum eigenvalue 
statistic. In the case of the trace statistic, the test is built as follows: 
 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 𝑟 ∗< 𝑘 
𝐻1: 𝑟 > 𝑟 ∗ 
 
and it works sequentially testing for 𝑟 ∗= 0,1,2. . 𝑒𝑡𝑐. The testing procedure begins checking 
the zero cointegrating equations case (a maximum rank of zero) and then accepts the first null 
hypothesis that we fail to reject. 
The null hypothesis of the maximum eigenvalue statistic is the same as in the trace statistic 
case, while the alternative is slightly different instead. The trace statistic has been chosen over 
the maximum eigenvalue because it is more robust to skewness and excess kurthosis (a check 
has been done also with the maximum eigenvalue statistic and the result does not change). We 
chose a lag length of 21 because it allows us to check for any monthly dependence between the 
variables.  
Just like with the unit root tests, we run this one with a constant term and without the trend 




                                                 
74 JOHANSEN S. (1991). Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian Vector 
Autoregressive Models. Econometrica, 59, 1551–1580. 
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Table 5.4. The Johansen test of cointegration 
MAXIMUM RANK EIGENVALUE TRACE STATISTIC 
5% CRITICAL 
VALUE 
0 . 30.7567 29.68 
1 0.01397 9.0391* 15.41 
2 0.00438 2.2556 3.76 
3 0.00146   
 
 
The results of the test are clear: at 5% critical value, we reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration while we fail to reject the null hypothesis of one cointegration equation; at rank 
one in fact the trace statistic is lower than the 5% critical value. Our variables are therefore 
characterized by one cointegrating relationship. 
Once the cointegration has been detected we know that there exists a long-term equilibrium 
relationship between the series, we can therefore apply the VECM in order to evaluate the short 
run properties of the cointegrated series. 
Given the characteristics of our variables, we can apply the appropriate restrictions to (4.20)75, 
obtaining 
 
 ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼(𝛽
′𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜇) + ∑ ℾ𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑖=1   (5.1) 
 
 
which, in our case, generates three equations, one for each variable.  
 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼1(𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑡−1 − 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑈𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜇) +






𝑖=1   (5.2) 
                                                 
75 We assume that that there are no linear time trends in our variables. We therefore allow the cointegration 
equations to be stationary around a constant mean but without allowing any other trends or constant terms. 
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∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼2(𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑡−1 − 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑈𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜇) +






𝑖=1   (5.3) 
 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑈𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼3(𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑡−1 − 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑈𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜇) +






𝑖=1   (5.4) 
 
The three equations contain both I(1) terms, the lag of the variables, and both I(0) terms, which 
correspond to the differenced variables and their lags. As already mentioned, the model has 
been run with a lag length of 21, because we believe that the allowances price may take some 
time to influence the PUN price given the way in which allowances are sold. With such a long 
time span we are able to check if there is any monthly correlation between our variables of 
interest. The restrictions imposed assure that there are no linear time trends in the levels of the 
data. Besides, the cointegrating equations are stationary around a mean. 
As discussed by Johansen (1955)76, to identify the parameters in β, at least r2 restriction are 
needed. Therefore, the Johansen normalization restriction has been imposed. 
 
5.3 The specification of the model 
Before analyzing the results of the model, we checked whether the model was well specified 
through some postestimation tests. More precisely, we decided to verify if the residuals of the 
model were not auto-correlated and, later, if the short-term variables were jointly significant. 
The failure of this type of analysis would suggest that we have to check the hypothesis on which 
our analysis is based. 
With the Lagrange-Multiplier test, we controlled if there was no auto-correlation in the 
residuals, the null hypothesis of the test. The results are reported in the appendix77. As it can be 
noted, almost all the p-values are above the 5% critical value: this led us to fail to reject the 
null-hypothesis of no auto-correlation. It’s therefore not a strong assumption to assume that the 
residuals are no auto-correlated. Thus, this test finds no evidence of model misspecification. 
                                                 
76 JOHANSEN S. (1955). Likelihood-Based inference in cointegrated vector autoregressive models. Oxford 
University Press. 
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Also, the overall significance of the short-term values has been checked through a Wald test, 
as suggested by Judge et al. (1985)78. The test statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with 
q degrees of freedom, where q denotes the number of linear hypothesis to be tested jointly. A 
test has been run for each variable in the first equation (5.2), checking for the jointly 
significance of all the lags of that variable. The null hypothesis is therefore that all lags are 
jointly equal to 0. Results are reported in the following table 
 
Table 5.5. The Wald test 
VARIABLE LAGS CHI2(20) PROB>CHI2 
ΔLOGPUN 20 159.79 0.0000 
ΔLOGGAS 20 42.44 0.0024 
ΔLOGEUA 20 37.01 0.0117 
 
 
As it can be noted from the table, all the p-values are below the 5% critical value. Hence, we 
reject the null-hypothesis of all lags equal to 0 for every variable of the first equation. This 
means that the electricity price is significantly correlated to the short-term lags. Besides, this 
test also does not provide any proof of misspecification in the model. We can therefore conclude 
that the model has been correctly defined. 
 
4.6 Results 
As it has already been stated, there are several steps through which a Vector Error Correction 
Model can be implemented. The results of the unit root tests confirmed that all the time series 
we were using were non-stationary I(1) processes. This allowed us to use the Johansen test for 
cointegration and identify one cointegrating relationship among the variables. Established so, 
we finally run the VECM. The model has been restricted so that no linear time trends to the 
levels of the data were possible; this restriction reflects the nature of our time series and it’s 
                                                 
78 JUDGE G.G, GRIFFITHS W.E, HILL R.C, LUTKEPOHL H. and LEE T-C. (1985). The Theory and Practice 
of Econometrics. 2nd ed.  
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confirmed by the information criteria used. Besides, to exactly identify the parameter β, the 
Johansen normalization restriction has been imposed. The Lagrange-multiplier test and a Wald 
test run on the short-term variables assured us about the well-specification of the model, while, 
an analysis of the Impulse Response Functions allowed us to better identify the nature of the 
causality between our variables of interest. 
The output of the model is fully reported in the appendix79. We will discuss here the results of 
the long run relationship relative to the first equation (5.2), our equation of interest. Note that 
since the model has been run in logarithms, all values can be interpreted as elasticities. 
Using our previous notation, we have estimated 
 
?̂? = (−0.089, −0.0007, 0.0045) 
?̂? = (1, 0.72622, 0.2061) 
𝑣 = (5.40𝑒 − 06, −0.0002, 0.00007) 
 
Where α is the vector of adjustment factors, β is the cointegrating vector and ν is the vector of 
the (restricted) constants. Be 
The cointegrating equation instead is given by the following table 
 
Table 5.6. The cointegrating equation 
BETA COEF. STD. ERR. Z P>|Z| 
LOGPUN 1 . . . 
LOGGAS -0.7262246 0.1169063 -6.21 0.000 
LOGEUA -0.206151 0.120413 -1.71 0.087 
_CONS -1.445163 . . . 
 
 
                                                 
79 Appendix B. The output of the model. 
The Empirical Analysis          57 
 
Hence, the long run relationship can be summarized as follow 
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑛 = 1.44 + 0.72𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑎𝑠 + 0.20𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑈𝐴 + 𝑡 (5.6) 
 
Overall, results confirm that the model fits well. In fact, all the variables in the cointegrating 
equation are significant with a p-value below the 10% threshold. Besides, the signs of long-run 
coefficients are perfectly in line with other similar studies (Lo Prete and Norman, 2013, among 
others)80. The significance of the first value in the α vector indicates that a long run causality 
running towards the pun from the other variables exists. More precisely it indicates that when 
the average electricity price is too high, it slowly falls back towards the equilibrium. Also, some 
short run relationships can be identified given the significance of the lagged variables. 
Equation 5.6 confirms our expectations about the relationship between the variables. In 
particular, an increase in the natural gas price and in the price of the allowances cause an 
increase in the Italian electricity price. Natural gas has a huge impact on the electricity price: a 
1% increase in the gas price produce in the long-run a 0.72% increase in the pun price. On the 
other hand, the impact of the allowances is lower: a 1% increase in the EUA is reflected in a 
0.20% increase in the Italian electricity price. 
 
4.5 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) 
Finally, in order to complete our analysis, the impulse response functions can be estimated and 
interpreted, as it is explained in detail by Lutkepohl (1993)81. In fact, in applied work, it is often 
of interest to know the response of one variable to an impulse in another variable in a system 
that involves a number of further variables as well. An IRF measures the impact of a unit 
increase in an exogenous variable on the endogenous variables over time. Note that whereas 
IRFs from a stationary VAR die out over time, in a cointegrating VECM this does not always 
happen. In fact, the I(1) variables modeled in our work are not mean reverting, and this implies 
that some shocks may not die out over time. IRFs are important because they allow us to identify 
the direction of the causality between the variables.  
                                                 
80 LO PRETE C., NORMAN C.S. (2013). Rockets and feathers in power future markets? Evidence 
from the second phase of the EU ETS. Energy Economics, 36, pp. 312-321. 
81 LUTKEPOHL H. (1993) 2nd ed. Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis. New York, Springer. 
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A problematic assumption of this type of analysis is that only one variable at a time is affected 
by a shock. This may not be realistic if the shocks in different variables are not independent. 
That’s the reason why we have decided to use orthogonalized shocks, which assume that a 
change in one component doesn’t have any effect on other components because the components 
are orthogonal (uncorrelated). 
In the following figures, firstly the effects of an orthogonalized shock in the variables towards 
the logPun are presented, then the opposite case is shown. 
 
Figure 5.2. The effects of orthogonalized shocks on the PUN variable 
 
Graph by Impulse variable and Response variable. 
 
As can be noted from the three graphs, an orthogonalized shock in each variable has effects on 
the logPun. The shocks in the Pun and Natural Gas variable have a clear positive effect on the 
electricity price, the former with a greater magnitude than the latter. On the contrary, the effect 
of an orthogonalized shock in the allowances prices on the Pun variable is not that clear.  The 
graph seems to confirm that a change in the allowance price takes some days to have an effect 
on the Italian electricity price in the short-run and this effect seems to be mainly positive. 
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Therefore, even if with different magnitudes, all the three shocks are likely to have permanent 
effects on the Prezzo Unico Nazionale. The greatest magnitude is given by a shock in the logPun 
variable itself, while the lowest, is given by the variable logEUA. According to this model, 
shocks in the average Italian electricity price, gas future price and allowances price, are likely 
to have a permanent effect on the average national electricity price in Italy. In order to be sure 
about the direction of the causality between the series, also the opposite case must be analyzed.  
In the figure 3, effects of an orthogonalized shock in the electricity price is shown. 
 
Figure 5.3. The effects of an orthogonalized shock in the PUN variable 
 
Graph by Impulse variable and Response variable. 
 
As expected, an orthogonalized shock in the PUN variable does not influence the allowances 
price and the natural gas future price. This is in line with the economics theory and outlines the 
direction of the causality between our variables. We can therefore conclude that while the 
allowances price and the natural effect price directly influence the Italian electricity price, the 
opposite case is not true. 
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The EU Emission System, firstly introduced in 2005, it’s now at its third phase after a 
continuous process of refinement and improvement. In its attempt to reach the goals it has 
established, the system exercises a strong influence in many markets in the European area. In 
fact, carbon prices raise costs associated with pollution and this can impact the competitiveness 
of certain industrial sectors.  
The overall electricity sector reacted to these higher costs by passing them on the electricity 
price and this is the reason why from 2012 the electricity market is subject to a 100% auctioning 
of the allowances. This change in policy could have had effects on the pass-through level and 
on the magnitude of this phenomenon and this is something that we decided to investigate. 
Our study analysed the relationship between the price of the allowances and the electricity price 
in the Italian market, which is one of the biggest European market in terms of size and electricity 
price level. All the time series we were using proved to be non-stationary I(1) processes and 
this is why we decided to use the maximum-likelihood technique developed by Johansen in the 
estimation of a Vector Error Correction Model. 
The results of our model confirmed that the EUAs price has a direct effect on the Pun price, the 
national Italian electricity price, also in the third phase of the EU ETS. More precisely, a 1% 
increase in the allowances price causes a 0.20% increase in the power price. This indeed is 
something we were expecting, since the costs associated with pollution have been already 
internalized by power suppliers during the first phases of the system. 
The results of our work confirm an overall heterogeneity in the response of the electricity 
generation sector to the new mechanisms introduced by the EU ETS. The pass-through effect 
we found is consistent with the work of many other researchers (e.g. Fabra and Reguant, 2014, 
among others)82 even if the magnitude can differ depending on the country and on the type of 
data used.  
A country’s electricity production mix could play an essential role in explaining different levels 
of passing-through. In fact, electricity prices can be more sensitive to carbon constraints when 
the composition of the energy mix is characterized by the predominance of fossil energy 
                                                 
82 FABRA N. and REGUANT M. (2014). Pass-through of Emissions Costs in Electricity Markets. American 
Economic Review, 104, pp. 2872-2899.  
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sources. On the contrary, when non-fossil energy power stations are the main source of 
production there is less need to use emission permits. In Italy, a relatively low level of passing-
through can be explained by a decreasing use of Natural Gas and Oil as a source of production 
over time and by an increasing share of renewables (accounting for almost 40% of the total 
sources of production). 
Finally, we wish to stress the fact that an increase in the electricity price due to an increase in 
the allowances price is efficient. Higher power prices in fact induce consumers to reduce their 
demand for carbon-generated electricity and producers to seek for least costs abatement options. 
This is perfectly in line with the scope of the EU Emission Trading System. 
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Appendix A. Results of the tests 
 
Table A.1. Information Criteria 
VARIABLE AIC HQIC SBIC 
LOGPUN 4 4 4 
LOGGAS 4 2 1 
LOGEUA 3 3 1 
 
Table A.1 reports the results of different information criteria applied to our variables of interest. 
In our research we mainly followed the AIC, even if a comparison with other information 
criteria has been often carried out. 
 
Table A.2. Unit root tests 
VARIABLE TEST LAG 
TEST 
STATISTIC 
ACCEPT H0, C.I C.I 
LOGPUN ADF 3 -4,46 No . 
LOGPUN PP 3 -6,603 No . 
LOGPUN DF-GLS 3 -2,272 Yes 1% 
LOGGAS ADF 2 -1.853 Yes 10% 
LOGGAS PP 2 -1.878 Yes 10% 
LOGEUA ADF 2 -2,515 Yes 10% 
LOGEUA PP 2 -2,754 Yes 5% 
LOGEUA DF-GLS 2 -2,351 Yes 10% 
LOGPUN KPSS 3 14.7 No 10% 
LOGEUA KPSS 2 2.88 No 10% 
LOGGAS KPSS 3 27 No 10% 
LOGPUN KPSS 3 14.7 No 10% 
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All the unit root tests have been run without the trend option and around a constant. Variables 
were not sensitive to the presence of a trend though. Gas and allowances prices show a strong 
evidence of non-stationarity while the behavior of the Pun variable is more ambiguous. This 
can arise from the fact that the electricity variable was obtained through a sequence of weighted 
averages; this could have softened its characteristics. That’s’ the reason why also the KPSS test 
has been run. 
 
Table A.3. The Lagrange-multiplier test 
LAG CHI2 DF PROB > CHI2 
1 6.5800 9 0.68075 
2 7.9348 9 0.54073 
3 9.0972 9 0.42835 
4 9.0176 9 0.43565 
5 14.0204 9 0.12160 
6 6.9798 9 0.63922 
7 18.5225 9 0.02957 
8 6.7183 9 0.66642 
9 15.3529 9 0.08169 
10 5.1599 9 0.82015 
11 6.3081 9 0.70873 
12 9.1191 9 0.42635 
13 8.8117 9 0.45484 
14 23.8872 9 0.00448 
15 2.9998 9 0.96430 
16 18.3307 9 0.03153 
17 5.4963 9 0.78908 
18 13.1251 9 0.15703 
19 11.8504 9 0.22187 
20 9.4060 9 0.40067 
21 4.4623 9 0.87844 
 
 
The Lagrange-multiplier test has a null-hypothesis of no auto-correlation in the residuals for a 
given lag. Since we obtained small p-values in almost each lag, we fail to reject the null of no 
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auto-correlation in the residuals. Overall, it’s not a strong assumption to assume we are in 
presence of no auto-correlation.  
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Appendix B. The output of the model 
Table B.1. The first equation 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
D_logPUN 
   
_ce1 
    
L1. -.0894145 .0197065 -4.54 0.000 
logPUN 
    
LD. -.313103 .0306494 -10.22 0.000 
L2D. -.2607936 .0316259 -8.25 0.000 
L3D. -.2035433 .0324381 -6.27 0.000 
L4D. -.0486016 .0328044 -1.48 0.138 
L5D. -.1019768 .0328853 -3.10 0.002 
L6D. -.0434326 .0327686 -1.33 0.185 
L7D. -.0615025 .0327133 -1.88 0.060 
L8D. -.0918352 .0326058 -2.82 0.005 
L9D. -.0759727 .0325423 -2.33 0.020 
L10D. -.0479196 .0323762 -1.48 0.139 
L11D. -.0736583 .032333 -2.28 0.023 
L12D. -.0542921 .0322821 -1.68 0.093 
L13D. -.0585034 .0320136 -1.83 0.068 
L14D. -.0612347 .031773 -1.93 0.054 
L15D. -.0628691 .0316313 -1.99 0.047 
L16D. -.0023948 .0312764 -0.08 0.939 
L17D. -.0415499 .0311442 -1.33 0.182 
L18D. .0344528 .0302088 1.14 0.254 
L19D. .0284434 .0285797 1.00 0.320 
L20D. -.0121389 .0263339 -0.46 0.645 
     
logGas 
    
LD. .3885818 .1529069 2.54 0.011 
L2D. .5605363 .1537264 3.65 0.000 
L3D. .3694915 .1543708 2.39 0.017 
L4D. .2639608 .1548632 1.70 0.088 
L5D. .1515499 .1551046 0.98 0.329 
L6D. -.0868002 .1549693 -0.56 0.575 
L7D. .1808339 .155546 1.16 0.245 
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L8D. .2581466 .1555155 1.66 0.097 
L9D. .3128453 .1555874 2.01 0.044 
L10D. -.003063 .1559185 -0.02 0.984 
L11D. .2060595 .155804 1.32 0.186 
L12D. .0807935 .1554033 0.52 0.603 
L13D. .0420264 .1555973 0.27 0.787 
L14D. .1376371 .1551262 0.89 0.375 
L15D. .2940199 .1541207 1.91 0.056 
L16D. .0765762 .1543418 0.50 0.620 
L17D. -.1229012 .1542624 -0.80 0.426 
L18D. -.0370783 .1540098 -0.24 0.810 
L19D. .0624064 .153833 0.41 0.685 
L20D. -.1966882 .1530834 -1.28 0.199 
     
logEUA 
    
LD. -.0533088 .0716545 -0.74 0.457 
L2D. -.0021307 .0719072 -0.03 0.976 
L3D. .002884 .0720726 0.04 0.968 
L4D. .0631006 .0720314 0.88 0.381 
L5D. -.0442208 .0720291 -0.61 0.539 
L6D. -.0014606 .072113 -0.02 0.984 
L7D. .0659514 .0720083 0.92 0.360 
L8D. -.1582806 .0719065 -2.20 0.028 
L9D. -.1092744 .0717231 -1.52 0.128 
L10D. -.0259482 .0718064 -0.36 0.718 
L11D. .0124202 .0717926 0.17 0.863 
L12D. -.1557891 .0716945 -2.17 0.030 
L13D. .0489241 .0719582 0.68 0.497 
L14D. -.0513903 .072069 -0.71 0.476 
L15D. .1388174 .0721396 1.92 0.054 
L16D. .1446192 .0721044 2.01 0.045 
L17D. .0345653 .0721124 0.48 0.632 
L18D. -.1785054 .0720164 -2.48 0.013 
L19D. .1637515 .0717088 2.28 0.022 
L20D. -.0548132 .0716917 -0.76 0.445 
_cons 5.40e-06 .0023496 0.00 0.998 
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Table B.2. The second equation 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
D_logGas 
    
_ce1 
    
L1. -.0007553 .0033761 -0.22 0.823 
logPUN 
    
LD. .0047644 .0052508 0.91 0.364 
L2D. .0026814 .0054181 0.49 0.621 
L3D. .0063057 .0055572 1.13 0.257 
L4D. .0026922 .00562 0.48 0.632 
L5D. .0124392 .0056339 2.21 0.027 
L6D. .0165568 .0056139 2.95 0.003 
L7D. .0181143 .0056044 3.23 0.001 
L8D. .0071603 .005586 1.28 0.200 
L9D. .0106346 .0055751 1.91 0.056 
L10D. .0054771 .0055466 0.99 0.323 
L11D. .0065538 .0055392 1.18 0.237 
L12D. .0071017 .0055305 1.28 0.199 
L13D. .0085749 .0054845 1.56 0.118 
L14D. .0036393 .0054433 0.67 0.504 
L15D. .0039584 .005419 0.73 0.465 
L16D. .004951 .0053582 0.92 0.355 
L17D. -.000994 .0053356 -0.19 0.852 
L18D. .0062722 .0051753 1.21 0.226 
L19D. .001083 .0048962 0.22 0.825 
L20D. .0080944 .0045115 1.79 0.073 
     
logGas 
    
LD. -.0681808 .0261958 -2.60 0.009 
L2D. .0274529 .0263361 1.04 0.297 
L3D. .0611529 .0264465 2.31 0.021 
L4D. -.0579945 .0265309 -2.19 0.029 
L5D. .023238 .0265723 0.87 0.382 
L6D. -.0913767 .0265491 -3.44 0.001 
L7D. -.0121926 .0266479 -0.46 0.647 
L8D. .010286 .0266427 0.39 0.699 
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L9D. .0501788 .026655 1.88 0.060 
L10D. .0639014 .0267117 2.39 0.017 
L11D. .0268318 .0266921 1.01 0.315 
L12D. -.0176752 .0266234 -0.66 0.507 
L13D. -.0261839 .0266567 -0.98 0.326 
L14D. -.0102918 .026576 -0.39 0.699 
L15D. .0382559 .0264037 1.45 0.147 
L16D. -.0308797 .0264416 -1.17 0.243 
L17D. -.0277455 .026428 -1.05 0.294 
L18D. -.0086259 .0263847 -0.33 0.744 
L19D. .016187 .0263544 0.61 0.539 
L20D. .0437863 .026226 1.67 0.095 
     
logEUA 
    
LD. .0431048 .0122757 3.51 0.000 
L2D. .0029423 .012319 0.24 0.811 
L3D. .0129713 .0123474 1.05 0.293 
L4D. .0083216 .0123403 0.67 0.500 
L5D. -.0083072 .0123399 -0.67 0.501 
L6D. -.0200813 .0123543 -1.63 0.104 
L7D. .0162352 .0123363 1.32 0.188 
L8D. -.0081116 .0123189 -0.66 0.510 
L9D. .0139454 .0122875 1.13 0.256 
L10D. -.0025347 .0123017 -0.21 0.837 
L11D. .0087652 .0122994 0.71 0.476 
L12D. -.0112428 .0122826 -0.92 0.360 
L13D. .0067738 .0123278 0.55 0.583 
L14D. -.0005259 .0123467 -0.04 0.966 
L15D. .0182289 .0123588 1.47 0.140 
L16D. .0079373 .0123528 0.64 0.521 
L17D. .0121104 .0123542 0.98 0.327 
L18D. -.0026971 .0123377 -0.22 0.827 
L19D. -.0053208 .012285 -0.43 0.665 
L20D. -.0171113 .0122821 -1.39 0.164 
_cons -.0002259 .0004025 -0.56 0.575 
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Table B.3. The third equation 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
D_logEUA 
   
_ce1 
    
L1. .00449 .0071647 0.63 0.531 
logPUN 
    
LD. -.002232 .0111432 -0.20 0.841 
L2D. -.0317971 .0114982 -2.77 0.006 
L3D. -.0111826 .0117935 -0.95 0.343 
L4D. -.017972 .0119267 -1.51 0.132 
L5D. -.0041222 .0119561 -0.34 0.730 
L6D. .0097171 .0119137 0.82 0.415 
L7D. .0148788 .0118936 1.25 0.211 
L8D. .016003 .0118545 1.35 0.177 
L9D. .0077546 .0118314 0.66 0.512 
L10D. .0044317 .011771 0.38 0.707 
L11D. .0041009 .0117553 0.35 0.727 
L12D. .0074766 .0117368 0.64 0.524 
L13D. -.0018216 .0116392 -0.16 0.876 
L14D. -.0225961 .0115517 -1.96 0.050 
L15D. -.0145301 .0115002 -1.26 0.206 
L16D. -.0188911 .0113711 -1.66 0.097 
L17D. -.0253607 .0113231 -2.24 0.025 
L18D. .0010052 .010983 0.09 0.927 
L19D. -.0155872 .0103907 -1.50 0.134 
L20D. -.0084442 .0095742 -0.88 0.378 
     
logGas 
    
LD. -.0230025 .0555923 -0.41 0.679 
L2D. -.0054562 .0558903 -0.10 0.922 
L3D. .032529 .0561246 0.58 0.562 
L4D. -.0226988 .0563036 -0.40 0.687 
L5D. -.0057197 .0563914 -0.10 0.919 
L6D. .0309259 .0563422 0.55 0.583 
L7D. -.0152446 .0565518 -0.27 0.787 
L8D. .0375618 .0565407 0.66 0.506 
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L9D. -.0366722 .0565669 -0.65 0.517 
L10D. .0594665 .0566872 1.05 0.294 
L11D. -.0449832 .0566456 -0.79 0.427 
L12D. -.0442112 .0564999 -0.78 0.434 
L13D. .0616716 .0565705 1.09 0.276 
L14D. .0025643 .0563992 0.05 0.964 
L15D. .047815 .0560336 0.85 0.393 
L16D. .0624747 .056114 1.11 0.266 
L17D. -.002541 .0560851 -0.05 0.964 
L18D. -.0398979 .0559933 -0.71 0.476 
L19D. .0363766 .055929 0.65 0.515 
L20D. .1482752 .0556565 2.66 0.008 
     
logEUA 
    
LD. -.0139852 .0260514 -0.54 0.591 
L2D. -.1028751 .0261433 -3.94 0.000 
L3D. -.0441083 .0262034 -1.68 0.092 
L4D. .0729821 .0261885 2.79 0.005 
L5D. .0403972 .0261876 1.54 0.123 
L6D. .0078233 .0262181 0.30 0.765 
L7D. .0230398 .02618 0.88 0.379 
L8D. .0293599 .026143 1.12 0.261 
L9D. .0279963 .0260763 1.07 0.283 
L10D. -.0014404 .0261066 -0.06 0.956 
L11D. .0212923 .0261016 0.82 0.415 
L12D. -.0817791 .026066 -3.14 0.002 
L13D. -.0529481 .0261618 -2.02 0.043 
L14D. -.0681202 .0262021 -2.60 0.009 
L15D. .0035608 .0262278 0.14 0.892 
L16D. -.0505169 .026215 -1.93 0.054 
L17D. -.0163046 .0262179 -0.62 0.534 
L18D. -.0682474 .026183 -2.61 0.009 
L19D. -.0008468 .0260711 -0.03 0.974 
L20D. -.0583626 .0260649 -2.24 0.025 
_cons .0000695 .0008542 0.08 0.935 
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Table B.4. The cointegrating equation 
BETA COEF. STD. ERR. Z P>Z 
LOGPUN 1 . . . 
LOGGAS -.7262246 .1169063 -6.21 0.000 
LOGEUA -.206151 .120413 -1.71 0.087 
_CONS -1.445.163 . . . 
 
  








❖ BONACINA M., GULLI F. (2007). Electricity pricing under “carbon emissions 
trading”: a dominant firm with competitive fringe model. Energy Policy, 35, pp. 4200-
4220. 
❖ BONENTI F., OGGIONI G., ALLEVI A. and MARANGONI G. (2013). Evaluating 
the EU ETS impacts on profits, investments and prices on the Italian electricity market. 
Energy Policy, 59, pp. 242-256. 
❖ BROWN L.M., HANAFI A. and PETSONK A. (2012). The EU Emissions Trading 
System: Results and Lessons Learned. 
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EU_ETS_Lessons_Learned_Report_EDF.pdf 
❖ CHEVALLIER J. (2010). Modelling risk premia in CO2 allowances spot and futures 
prices. Economic Modelling, 27, pp. 717-729. 
❖ DAVIDSON J. (2009). When is a Time Series I(0)? In The Methodology and Practice 
of Econometrics. Oxford University Press, available at 
http://people.exeter.ac.uk/jehd201/WhenisI0.pdf 
❖ DICKEY D.A. and FULLER W.A. (1979). Distribution of the estimators for 
autoregressive time series with a unit root. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 74, pp. 427–431. 
❖ ELLERMAN A.D., BUCHNER B.K. (2007). The European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme: Origins, Allocation and Early results. Review of Environmental Economics 
and Policy: pp. 66-87. 
❖ ELLERMAN A.D., CONVERY F.J. and DE PERTHIUS C. (2010). Pricing Carbon: 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. Cambridge University Press. 
❖ ELLIOT G.R., ROTHENBERG T.J., and STOCK J.H. (1996). Efficient tests for an 
autoregressive unit root. Econometrica, 64: pp. 813–836. 
❖ ENGLE R.F. and GRANGER W.J. (1987). Co-integration and error correction: 
Representation, estimation and testing. Econometrica. 55: pp. 251–276. 
❖ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2000). Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions 
trading within the European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52000DC0087 
❖ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2010). Commission Decision of 9 July 2010 on the 
Community-wide quantity of allowances to be issued under the EU Emission Trading 
76 The impact of CO2 cost on the Italian electricity price. A VECM analysis 
 
Scheme for 2013. (2010/384/EU). Official Journal of the European Union, 175/36. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32010D0384 
❖ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2011). Commission decision of 29.03.2011 on guidance 
on the methodology to transitionally allocate free emission allowances to installations 
in respect of electricity pursuant to Article 10c(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC. 
❖ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2011). Commission Decision of 27 April 2011 
determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission 
allowances pursuant to Article 10a od Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council. Official Journal of the European Union, 130/1. 
❖ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2011). The EU ETS is delivering emission cuts. 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/factsheet_ets_emissions_en.pdf 
❖ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2015). Proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-
effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments. 2015/148. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2015:0337:FIN 
❖ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2018). The commission calls for a climate neutral 
Europe by 2050. Brussels. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6543_en.htm 
❖ FABRA N. and REGUANT M. (2014). Pass-through of Emissions Costs in Electricity 
Markets. American Economic Review, 104, pp. 2872-2899 
❖ GRANGER C.W.J and SWANSON N.R. (1997). An introduction to stochastic unit-
root processes. Journal of Econometrics, 80, pp. 35-62. 
❖ HEALY S., SCHUMACHER K., STROIA A. and SLINGERLAND S. (2015).  Review 
of literature on EU ETS Performance. Öko-Institut Working Paper 2/2015. 
https://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/2455/2015-001-en.pdf 
❖ HINTERMANN B. (2010). Allowance price drivers in the first phase of the EU ETS. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 59, pp. 43-56. 
❖ HINTERMANN B. (2016). Pass-Through of CO2 Emission Costs to Hourly Electricity 
Prices in Germany. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource 
Economists, 3. 
❖ HOURCADE J.C., NEUHOFF K., DEMAILLY D. and SATO M. (2007). 
Differentiation and Dynamics of EU ETS Industrial Competitiveness Impacts. Climate 
Strategies, Cambridge. 
❖ JOHANSEN S. (1955). Likelihood-Based inference in Cointegrated Vector 
Autoregressive Models. Oxford University Press. 
Bibliography                 77 
 
❖ JOHANSEN S. (1988). Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 12, pp. 231-254. 
❖ JOHANSEN S. (1991). Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in 
Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models. Econometrica, 59, pp. 1551–1580. 
❖ JOUVET P. and SOLIER B. (2013). An overview of CO2 cost pass-through to electricity 
prices in Europe. Energy policy, 61, pp. 1370-1376. 
❖ KUIK O., HOFKES M. (2010). Border adjustment for European Emission trading: 
Competitiveness and carbon leakage. Energy Policy, 38, pp. 1741-1748. 
❖ KWIATKOWSKI D., PHILLIPS P.C.B., SCHMIDT P., and SHIN Y. (1992). Testing 
the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root: How sure are 
we that economic time series have a unit root? Journal of Econometrics, 54, pp. 159–
178 
❖ LAING T., SATO M., GRUBB M. and COMBERTI C. (2013). Assessing the 
Effectiveness of the EU Emission Trading System. Centre for Climate Change 
Economics and Policy, 126. 
❖ LIVERMAN D.M. (2009). Conventions of climate change: constructions of danger and 
the dispossession of the atmosphere. Journal of Historical Geography 35: pp. 279-296. 
❖ LO PRETE C., NORMAN C.S. (2013). Rockets and feathers in power future markets? 
Evidence from the second phase of the EU ETS. Energy Economics, 36, pp. 312-321. 
❖ LUTKEPOHL H. (1993) 2nd ed. Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis. New 
York, Springer. 
❖ MANUCA R. and SAVIT R. (1996). Stationarity and nonstationarity in time series 
analysis. Psysica D, 99, pp. 134-161. 
❖ MARCU A., EGENHOFER C., ROTH S. and STOEFS W. (2013). Carbon Leakage: 
An Overview. Centre for European policy Studies. CEPS Special Report 79. 
❖ MARKUSEN J.R. (1975). International externalities and optimal tax structures. 
Journal of International Economics, 5, 15-29. 
❖ MARTIN R., MUÛLS M. and WAGNER U. (2012). An evidence review of the EU 
Emissions Trading System, focusing on effectiveness of the system in driving industrial 
abatement. Department of Energy and Climate Change. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/48449/5725-an-evidence-review-of-the-eu-emissions-trading-sys.pdf 
❖ PHILLIPS P.C.B. (1986). Understanding Spurious Regressions in Econometrics. 
Journal of Econometrics, 33, pp: 311-340. 
78 The impact of CO2 cost on the Italian electricity price. A VECM analysis 
 
❖ PHILLIPS P.C.B., and PERRON P. (1988). Testing for a unit root in time series 
regression. Biometrika, 75, pp. 335–346. 
❖ RADOV D., KLEVNAS P. (2007). CO2 cost pass through: German Competition 
Regulators’ shaky economics. Energy Regulation Insight, 31, pp. 1-7. 
❖ SIJM J., HERS S.J., LISE W. and WETZELAER B.J.H.W. (2008). The impact of the 
EU ETS on electricity prices. Final report to DG environment of the European 
Commissions. 
❖ SIJM J., NEUHOFF K. and CHEN Y. (2011). CO2 cost pass-through and windfall 
profits in the power sector. Climate Policy, 6: pp 49-76. 
❖ UNITED NATIONS. (1998). Kyoto protocol to the united nations framework 
convention on climate change. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf 
❖ UNITED NATIONS. (2011). Compilation and synthesis of fifth national 
communications. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/sbi/eng/inf01.pdf 
❖ ZACHMAN G., HIRSCHHAUSEN C. (2008) First evidence of asymmetric cost pass-
through of EU emissions allowances: examining wholesale prices in Germany. 
Economics Letters, 99, pp. 465-469. 
 
  
List of Laws                 79 
 
List of Laws 
 
❖ COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) NO 1031/2010 of 12 November 2010 on the 
timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission 
allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowances trading within 
the Community. Official Journal of the European Union, 302/1.   
❖ DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 16 MARZO 1999, N.79, attuazione della direttiva 
96/92/CE recante norme comuni per il mercato interno dell’energia elettrica. Gazzetta 
Ufficiale, 75. 
❖ DIRECTIVE 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 
1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. Official Journal 
of the European Union, 27.  
❖ DIRECTIVE 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 96/92/EC – Statements made with regard to decommissioning and waste 
management activities. Official Journal of the European Commission, 176.  
❖ DIRECTIVE 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 
2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC. Official Journal of the 
European Union, 257/32.  
❖ DIRECTIVE 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
directive 2003/87/ec establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanism. 
Official Journal of the European Union, 338/18.  
❖ DIRECTIVE 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and the Council amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse 
gas emission allowance trading within the Community. Official Journal of the 
European Union, 8/3.                                            
❖ DIRECTIVE 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission 
allowances trading scheme of the Community. Journal of the European Union, 140/63.  
80 The impact of CO2 cost on the Italian electricity price. A VECM analysis 
 
❖ DIRECTIVE 2018/410/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 
2018 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions 
and low-carbon investments, and Decision (EU) 2015/1814. Official Journal of the 
European Union, 76/3.  
❖ DIRECTIVE 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading scheme of the Community. Official Journal of the European 
Union, 140/63.  
❖ LAW NO. 99 OF JULY 23, 2009 containing Provisions for the Development and 
Internationalization of Enterprises and Energy. Ordinary Supplement to Official 
Journal, 17.
 
 
 
